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One of the least understood issues in language evolution is how hominins were able to
ground and establish a shared lexicon. Recently, researchers have explored this issue us-
ing a variety of computational models, whose results have suggested that a shared lexi-
con could have emerged spontaneously through a process of self-organisation. However,
these models have used psychologically unrecognised concept representations and an
oversimplified environment. In this dissertation, I present a new computational model
in an attempt to address these problems. Agents’ category representations are inspired
by prototype theory, having central members and graded membership. The environ-
ment consists of an infinite number of objects, and has a probabilistic structure which
can be easily manipulated through model parameters. Despite the relatively complex
model, simulation results are generally in line with previous ones and add further sup-
port to the self-organisation hypothesis. In addition, the speed and level of lexical con-
vergence depend on the world structure, confirming that this is an aspect of past models
which has seen too little attention. Future work should investigate the vast parameter
space in further detail, and extend the simulations in various new directions.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Stages in Language Evolution
The evolution of language presents science with a very difficult problem, since it does
not leave clear evidence in the fossil record (Davidson 2003), it does not have any close
counterpart in animal communication (Hauser 1996), and it is a result of the complex
interaction of at least three different dynamic systems operating on massively different
timescales (Kirby 2002). Nevertheless, as a large body of recent research demonstrates,
it is possible to study it indirectly from a wide variety of perspectives (Christiansen &
Kirby 2003).
One of the key ideas that has emerged, although not unopposed (Lanyon 2006), is that
language evolved in stages (Bickerton 1990). Jackendoff (1999) expanded on this pro-
posal, postulating 11 different stages, which by hypothesis correspond with periods in
hominin evolution. The earliest of these stages featured a very simple language, con-
sisting of holistic utterances with no symbol concatenation or syntax. Although there
are various ways of imagining the nature of such utterances (Wray 1998), in this disser-
tation I will assume, following Hurford (forthcoming), that the earliest words referred
to objects and events in the world, and were understood situationally with the help of
pragmatic inference.
In order for such a one-word stage to emerge, various preadaptations would had to
have been in place (at least partially), including the physiological capacity to produce
1
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and perceive signals, the ability to understand the intentions of others, and the moti-
vation to communicate with others in the first place (Hurford 1999). Although all such
preadaptations are very important and require further research, in this study I will focus
on the last: the ability to associate non-situation-specific word forms with their referents
in the world. In addition, I will assume, for the sake of concreteness that language had
vocal origins, although arguments have also been made for a gestural route (Corballis
2003).
1.2 Words, Concepts, and Evolution
However, the relationships between word forms and referents are conventional and ar-
bitrary, with no intrinsic association between them. Consequently, in order to use a word
like “tree”, it is necessary for the word form to be attached to something else in the mind.
But obviously we cannot do so by planting trees in our brain; instead, we do so by form-
ing a concept of a tree, which is associated with both the word “tree” and actual trees
in the world. Thus concepts mediate the relationships between word forms and their
referents (Pierce 1955).
Unfortunately, this need for conceptual intermediacy introduces two problems. First
of all, as manifested by cross-linguistic differences, there are different possible ways
to divide the world up into conceptual categories, even in such fundamental domains
as space (Majid et al. 2004). Although such differences are surmountable in modern
language-entrenched societies (except perhaps for second language learners), they are
likely to have been significant among a group of prelinguistic hominins who were in-
venting and conventionalising their first words. Secondly, a conceptual capacity in ani-
mals and even prelinguistic human infants is often questioned, and some philosophers
even argue that concepts cannot exist without words (e.g., Davidson 2001). If this is
the case, then explaining how words first became established becomes much more diffi-
cult, unless one replaces concepts with something less sophisticated, such as perceptual
categories (Barsalou 1999) or “proto-concepts” (Hurford forthcoming).
However, even if we grant that hominins were sufficiently equipped to use a holistic lan-
guage on an individual level, there still remains a major mystery: how could a popula-
tion of hominins agree on the meanings of their first words, without the help of language
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(as occurs in dictionaries)? In particular, how did the meanings of the earliest words get
grounded (Harnad 1990)?
Over the last twenty years, many researchers have been investigating this issue with the
use of computer models (Steels 1997, Hurford 1989, Vogt in press). Having equipped
abstract agents with certain cognitive abilities and exposed them to a simulated envi-
ronment, many simulations have suggested that the emergence of a coherent lexicon can
occur through a process of self-organisation (Ashby 1947). However, these studies are
typically done using representations of the environment and of agents’ categories that
are unrealistic and oversimplified, making the agents’ task too easy.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
In this dissertation, I try to address this concern by arguing for and designing a model
with a more complex environmental structure and a more psychologically plausible cat-
egory representation. I will first review the psychology literature on concepts, followed
by an examination of past computational models. Then I will motivate and present my
new model, and present some preliminary results. Finally, I will discuss the results and





Categorisation is a fundamental cognitive skill of both humans and animals that helps
make sense of the world. As Mervis & Rosch (1981) note, “without any categorisation
an organism could not interact profitably with the infinitely distinguishable objects and
events it experiences” (p. 94). In fact, not only do we constantly encounter new things
in our environment, but even familiar things appear and behave differently in different
circumstances. No two stimuli are ever exactly the same.
To illustrate, when we see a lion in the savanna, we do not treat it as if it were a com-
pletely new and unfamiliar object; rather, we recognise it as a lion, infer information
about it, and respond accordingly. The same is true of animals: indeed, if antelopes, for
example, couldn’t distinguish lions from other things in their environment, then they
would not have survived for very long in the competitive world of natural selection.
However, it is important to be cautious about drawing premature conclusions from cat-
egorisation abilities. In particular, a creature’s ability to group two stimuli into the same
category does not necessarily imply that it has a mental concept of that category. For
instance, frogs instinctively lash out their tongues to catch flies (as opposed to leaves or
other small things in the air). As Hurford (forthcoming) argues, this shows that their
brains are in different states for the two kinds of stimuli. Yet it does not necessarily
prove that there are sophisticated human-like mental representations or images in the
frog’s mind (Herrnstein 1991).
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2.2 Features
Although it is clear that both animals and humans categorise stimuli, it is much less
obvious exactly on what basis they do so. Intuitively, categories should be based on
some kind of similarity, so that objects which are more similar to each other tend to be
grouped together. But similarity is a vague and abstract term: precisely what are the
criteria that are used to judge the degree of similarity between two things?
Perhaps the most natural candidates for categorisation lie in perception (Barsalou 1999):
stimuli are similar insofar as they share perceptual features. For instance, apples can
be easily distinguished from bananas by their size, shape, colour, smell and taste: all of
these are properties that can be perceived through our senses. And indeed, these may
be the only criteria available to infants: “From the infant’s perspective, all that can be
used to distinguish the categories is evidence that is readily perceptible in the immediate
environment” (Murphy 2002, p. 293). Perceptual features are also heavily involved in
animal categorisation, such as that of pigeons (Watanabe et al. 1995).
However, perceptual features are often insufficient, as many categories also require con-
ceptual knowledge (Mandler et al. 1991). Furniture, for example, comes in all kinds of
shapes, sizes and colours, and there are few perceptual features, if any, that distinguish
furniture as a group. What they do share in common is their general function, an un-
derstanding of which requires experience and knowledge about the world. It is thus not
surprising that there appears to be a shift in infant categorisation from being primarily
perceptual to a mix of perceptual and conceptual (Oakes et al. 1997).
The distinction between conceptual information, perceptual features and concepts them-
selves is not as clear-cut as it may first appear, however. If we look more closely at
commonly posited features, they almost invariably turn out to be based on preexisting
concepts. For instance, suppose we characterise dogs as having features like “has four
legs”, “barks”, “salivates”, “wags tail”, and “has large ears”. All of these features are
cognitively complex, and, in fact, seemingly composed of concepts themselves (Taylor
1995). This recursive problem is even more clear for conceptual information used in
categorisation, such as “used at home” (a possible feature of furniture). One potential
solution is offered by Schyns et al. (1998), who suggest a dynamically expanding set of
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features, in which infants start with very low-level perceptual features, from which more
complex features are created when required.
It is worth mentioning a potential source of confusion with feature terminology. Mervis
& Rosch (1981) pointed out that one can make a distinction between representing fea-
tures as discrete (e.g., [size=large]) or continuous (e.g., [size=0.3]). Discrete characterisa-
tions (often called features) are more intuitive, but they presuppose a “large” category.
On the other hand, continuous representations (sometimes called dimensions) are more
difficult to understand, but are in a relatively raw, unprocessed form. Nevertheless, it is
generally possible to translate between the two representations (Smith & Medin 1981).
In this dissertation, I will focus on a continuous “dimension” representation, but will use
the term “feature” interchangeably when it seems more natural.
2.3 Structure
Even assuming that we can accurately identify an object’s perceptual features, however,
the question remains of how we use these features to categorise it. For instance, when
looking at an orange, how does one determine that it’s an orange, as opposed to a grape-
fruit, a plastic toy orange, or a small orange ball? Several theories have attempted to
address this issue.
2.3.1 Classical Theory
In the classical theory, which can be traced back to Aristotle (Apostle 1980), concepts
are represented as strict sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. This implies that all
members of a category are equal, and that category boundaries are rigid. For instance,
triangles are defined as three-straight-sided geometric figures, and it is normally trivial
to decide whether or not a figure is a triangle. The elegance of the classical view is that
determining category membership is a clean and unambiguous binary decision.
However, although efficient in principle, this theory has severe problems. Most seri-
ously, for many concepts, it is virtually impossible to find solid definitional conditions
that fit every member while excluding every non-member. In attempting to find a defini-
tion for the concept of games, Wittgenstein (1953) argued that it was impossible and that
concepts were characterised instead by “family resemblances”. Indeed, his argument
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applies to just about any concept. Although classical categories are generally thought
to work best in technical fields in which definitions are necessary, even the applicabil-
ity of technical categories like “planet” and “strike” (in baseball) are sometimes unclear
(Murphy 2002), and the same is even true of triangles which have been drawn sloppily.
Consequently, the classical theory “has simply ceased to be a serious contender in the
psychology of concepts” (Murphy 2002, p. 38).
2.3.2 Prototype Theory
In the 1970’s, Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues followed up on Wittgenstein’s (1953) ar-
gument and argued for a different psychological basis for categories, which has become
known as prototype theory (e.g., Rosch 1978, Mervis & Rosch 1981). In stark contrast to
the classical view, the emphasis in prototype theory is on the categories’ centres rather
than their boundaries. The best examples of categories are their prototypes, and the
membership of an object depends on its degree of similarity to a category’s prototype.
Consequently, categories have unequal members, graded structure and fuzzy bound-
aries. For example, in the category of birds, sparrows and robins are normally typical
members, while ostriches and penguins are peripheral.
Rosch’s claims were supported by a large body of empirical studies. Many of these stud-
ies showed that “the prototypicality of items within a category can be shown to affect vir-
tually all of the major dependent variables used as measures in psychological research”
(Rosch 1978, p. 38), such as reaction time, speed of learning of new categories, order of
category learning, order of spontaneous listing, and effect of priming (e.g., Rosch 1975,
Rosch, Simpson & Miller 1976, Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem 1976).
Rosch also investigated goodness of category membership, by asking subjects to assign
values on a scale to items (e.g., Rosch 1975). For instance, 200 college students were
asked to rank items of furniture on a scale of 1 (high) to 7 (low), and there was generally
good agreement between the subjects: out of sixty items investigated, chairs and sofas
had the highest average scores (1.04), telephones the worst (6.68), with buffets and lamps
in the middle (2.89 and 2.94, respectively).
Rosch also claimed that using prototypes is cognitively efficient (Rosch 1978), appealing
to two principles. First, the category system should try to maximise information while
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minimising cognitive effort. That is, it should form enough categories to allow for dis-
tinctions between stimuli, but not so many as to make unnecessary distinctions. Second,
the world is not structured in an arbitrary way, but rather contains highly correlated
structure. In particular, not all possible combinations of features occur in the world,
some being much more probable than others. For instance, things with feathers tend to
have beaks and to fly, while things with fur tend to have mouths and walk (Mervis &
Rosch 1981). An efficient category system should exploit these correlations. In particular,
knowing what category something belongs to should maximise what we know about its
features, and, conversely, knowing a single feature of something should suggest what
category it belongs to (what Rosch calls “cue validity”). Rosch argues for the usefulness
of prototypes in such a structured world, concluding that they “appear to be just those
members of a category that most reflect the redundancy structure of the category as a
whole” Rosch (1978)(p. 37).
There are several issues that are problematic or at least vague in prototype theory, how-
ever. Perhaps most importantly, it is not clear what exactly is the nature of the prototype.
As Taylor (1995) points out, a prototype can be thought of as either the central member
(or members) of a category, or as “a schematic representation of the conceptual core of
a category” (p. 59). Taylor (1995) and Murphy (2002) both argue for the latter, and in
fact, Rosch & Mervis (1975) appears to favour it as well. In addition, what does it mean
for something to have partial category membership? Lakoff (1987) draws a distinction
between degree of membership and goodness of example, claiming that while sparrows
may be better examples of birds (and thus more prototypical) than penguins, both are
full-fledged members of the bird category. Croft & Cruse (2004) raise a similar issue with
respect to fuzzy boundaries, arguing that an individual’s category boundaries are sharp
at any given time, although they may shift from time to time and vary from person to
person. Finally, as Rosch (1978) herself points out, although experiments have revealed
the pervasiveness of prototype effects in human categorisation, prototypes “only con-
strain but do not specify representation and process models” (p. 41).
Unlike its classical predecessor, prototype theory has, so far, generally stood the test of
time. Although it has not undergone significant theoretical developments recently, it
is still considered one of the major theories of categorisation (Murphy 2002). Moreover,
prototype effects continue to be found in recent studies of categorisation in human adults
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(Smith & Minda 1998), children (Hayes & Taplin 1993) and prelinguistic infants (Ruben-
stein et al. 1999), as well as, more debatably, in animals such as baboons (Depy et al.
1997) and even pigeons (Fagot 2000) (although these effects can sometimes be explained
by alternative theories as well). Also, prototype theory has been applied not only to
basic object categories (as in most of Rosch’s studies), but also events (Croft 1990), adjec-
tives (Smith et al. 1988), and even “ad hoc” categories like “things to take on a picnic”
(Barsalou 1983).
2.3.3 Other Theories
Although still a major force in psychology, prototype theory has been seriously chal-
lenged by several theoretical alternatives, and is by no means the uncontested champion
of concept theories. In this section I introduce two of the most dominant alternative pro-
posals: exemplar theory and theory theory. However, since the computational model I
develop in Chapter 4 is based on prototype theory, I will only give a very brief overview
of these approaches here.
Exemplar theory is based on the originally revolutionary idea that concepts are rep-
resented in terms of remembered exemplars rather than summary representations (as
assumed in both classical and prototype theory) (Medin & Schaffer 1978). As in the
prototype view, categorisation depends on similarity, but in this case, a stimulus is com-
pared to the individual exemplars in each category, rather than only the prototypes. In
this theory, typicality effects thus derive from an item being similar to many exemplars
of a certain category as opposed to other categories (Nosofsky & Palmeri 1997).
Theory theory emphasises that our individual concepts cannot be separated from our
general knowledge of the world (Keil 1992, Murphy & Medin 1985). People have naive
“theories” about the world which they use to categorise stimuli. These theories help de-
cide which of an infinite number of possible features of objects is relevant to membership
in a given category (Murphy 2002). They also facilitate the use of categorisation criteria
that do not have clear featural bases. For instance, deciding whether or not something
is a weapon depends primarily not on simple features, but on judging how effective it
would be in hurting people (Barsalou 1985).
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Although the classical theory is clearly inadequate, “there is no clear, dominant win-
ner” from among the prototype, exemplar and theory theories (Murphy 2002, p. 488).
For many phenomena, more than one theory can provide explanations in different but
equally satisfying (or unsatisfying) ways. Indeed, Barsalou (1990) has argued that proto-
type and exemplar theory are indistinguishable. A full account of categorisation would
seem to require an integration or compromise of the different theories. Indeed, recent at-
tempts at doing this can be found in both theoretical and empirical research (e.g., Smith
& Minda 1998, Murphy 2002).
2.4 Origin
2.4.1 Humans
Many researchers argue that human concepts and knowledge are at least partly innate.
Fodor (1998) claims that humans have a system of basic innate concepts, which serve
as foundations for the building of more complex concepts. Shepard (1994) argues that
such innate concepts are evolutionarily driven, as individuals with certain innately in-
ternalised concepts would be favourably adapted to certain environments. Spelke (1994)
overviews initial knowledge in infant cognition and argues that much of it is innate and
triggered early in development, such as the ability to perceptually single out objects in
the environment.
Of course, these innate concepts need to be supplemented by conceptual development
ontogenetically in order to explain the full range of human concepts. The role of the
environment is clearly crucial to much of conceptual development (Elman et al. 1996),
as there are clearly cases which have no precedent in our evolutionary past and require
experience to be learned (e.g., telephones). Human children not only develop more com-
plex concepts through their interactions with the physical world, but also through their
social interactions. (e.g., Keil 1992). Indeed, language itself appears to play an important
role in conceptual development and thought (Bowerman & Levinson 2001, Gumperz &
Levinson 1996).
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2.4.2 Animals
Animal concepts are even trickier to study than human ones, largely because they are
difficult to probe linguistically. In fact, it is disputed whether animals even have con-
cepts at all (Davidson 2001). However, there is plenty of evidence that animals do have
knowledge about things in the world (e.g., Tomasello & Call 1997), and whether or
not we attribute the term “concepts” to this knowledge is largely a matter of definition
(Hurford forthcoming). Indeed, Herrnstein (1991) presents a scale of different degrees
of categorisation ability, ranging from the instinctive behaviour of venus flytraps to fully
sophisticated abstract human concepts.
Compared to humans, however, a large proportion of animal concepts appears to be in-
nate. For instance, new-born chicks, upon their first exposure to light, already have an
instinct to approach objects which exhibit biological motion (i.e., living things) (Vallorti-
gara et al. 2005). Similarly, infant vervet monkeys can produce and appropriately react
to signals corresponding to different kinds of predators (Seyfarth & Cheney 1990).
On the other hand, animals are also capable of learning some new concepts or refin-
ing innate ones (e.g., Seyfarth & Cheney 1986). Various attempts have been made, with
mixed success, to see if animals could learn abstract concepts, such as sameness, transi-
tivity and number (Hurford forthcoming). The most sophisticated examples of learned
concepts in animals are probably those of enculturated chimpanzees, who acquire a wide
variety of knowledge and abilities that they do not have in the wild (Tomasello & Call
2004). However, even species which are phylogenetically distant from humans, such as
parrots, have been shown capable of learning basic abstract relations (Pepperberg 1999).
2.5 Lexicalisation
It is important to distinguish conceptual abilities from signal-meaning associations (Hur-
ford forthcoming). How do human children associate words to concepts, and to what
extent can animals achieve this?
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2.5.1 Humans
As dictionaries show, it is relatively easy to learn new words once a basic vocabulary has
been developed. On the other hand, grounding one’s first words and thus successfully
overcoming Quine’s (1960) dilemma is quite a feat. And yet virtually all human children
do it all the time, producing their first words at roughly 1 year of age (Clark 2003) and be-
ginning to understand their parents even earlier (Tincoff & Jusczyk 1999). By adulthood,
humans effortlessly use tens of thousand of words, often in multiple languages.
In order to explain this, various word learning constraints and mechanisms have been
postulated, supported by psychological studies with young children. The whole object
bias states that children assume that words refer to entire objects, rather than their prop-
erties or parts (Macnamara 1972). According to the taxonomic bias, children believe that
words refer to object kinds (taxonomic relations) rather than themes (thematic relations)
(Markman & Hutchinson 1984). The shape bias claims that children are more prone to
associate a word with things which have the same shape rather than some other com-
mon property (Landau et al. 1988). The mutual exclusivity bias (Markman 1989) and the
principle of contrast (Clark 1987) are related proposals, based on the idea that children
will initially assume that different words refer to different things. And Tomasello (2000)
has emphasised the role of children’s socio-cognitive abilities, and especially their un-
derstanding of others intentions, as important keys to word learning. With respect to
all of these constraints, however, it is important to note that it is not clear whether they
are specific to word learning or derive from more general cognitive mechanisms (Bloom
2000).
Finally, we should note that in the evolution of language, word invention must have
initially been equally important to word learning. Since modern human children can
rely on the preexistence of language vocabularies, very little is known on this subject,
but children’s invention of “proto-words” (Halliday 1975) and their use in parent-child
interaction (Camaioni et al. 2003) have been documented.
2.5.2 Animals
In considering word learning in animals, a distinction should be made between signals
in animal communication systems and the words of human language.
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Although signals in animal communication systems, such as those of vervet monkeys,
are mostly innate, they can be ontogenetically refined. For instance, young vervet mon-
keys sometimes produce a snake alarm call upon seeing a long thin stick, but such mis-
takes disappear over time (Seyfarth & Cheney 1980). Also, there are some signals, such
as whale songs, which are culturally learned by individuals and transmitted to others
(Tyack & Sayigh 1997). In addition, in some primate species, individuals listen to the
vocalisations of others in different situations and pragmatically infer information from
them (Seyfarth & Cheney 2006). According to Pika & Liebal (2006), apes also develop
gestures and communicate intentionally with them, although these differ significantly
from those of human children in that they are always used dyadically and imperatively.
As for animals trained in human language, the most successful have generally been apes,
although surprisingly good results have also been found with parrots and dogs. Sue
Savage-Rumbaugh and her colleagues have engaged in long term enculturation projects
with bonobos and chimpanzees (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993, 1990). They have argued
that the symbol learning and production of one of their bonobos in particular occurred
spontaneously and parallelled that of human children quite closely. Pepperberg (1999)
has trained parrots using a competitive paradigm, and one of them can not only linguis-
tically label objects, but even use and understand relational terms, such as “shape” and
“colour”. Finally, Kaminski et al. (2004) have reported a case of a dog who can under-
stand about 200 human words and can apparently learn and retain new words from a




As mentioned in Chapter 1, the difficulties of studying language evolution have resulted
in the innovation of a variety of alternative indirect techniques. One of the more fruitful
paradigms over the last twenty years has been computational modelling. But what is the
relevance of modern computers to complex real world phenomena such as the evolution
of language?
Figure 3.1 shows how computer modelling can be used, based on a general argument
made by Noble (1998). Suppose we wish to explain a real-world phenomenon of interest
ER, and we hypothesise that it emerges from a certain set of low-level assumptions,AR.
If we cannot test this hypothesis directly (as with language evolution), then a compu-
tational framework provides an alternative. We model the assumptions AR with com-
putational counterparts, AM . We then explore the effects of AM by running simulations
with them, obtaining a simulated phenomenon EM . Returning to the real world, our
theory (i.e., AR → ER) can be potentially supported insofar as EM resembles ER in its
salient aspects. Notice that the process is cyclic: the results from simulations can refine
our understanding of the phenomenon, leading us to modify our hypothesis, etc.
3.2 Dangers
Yet just as this argument highlights the potential of computational modelling, it also
reveals some of its dangers. In particular, there is usually an implicit assumption in
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Figure 3.1: Computational modelling diagram: A visualisation of Noble’s (1998) justification of
computational modelling. ER, the real-world phenomenon under study, is first hypothesised to
be the result of AR, a set of low-level real-world assumptions. These assumptions are modelled
as AM , and then simulations are run to obtain results, EM . If EM and ER are sufficiently similar,
then the hypothesis is supported.
computational models that the mappings between the model and the world, AR → AM
and EM → ER, are simpler than the strictly in-world mapping, AR → ER. Such an
assumption is perhaps necessary to justify the use of computational models, but it can-
not be taken for granted. After all, computer models need to abstract and simplify the
phenomena they investigate, and it’s far from obvious that these transformations are
inconsequential. Therefore, while computational models are good tools for exploring
language evolution, their interpretation should be treated with great caution.
3.3 Previous models
Since the first attempts nearly twenty years ago (Hurford 1989), a large number of com-
putational models has addressed a variety of phenomena in language evolution, such as
phonological systems (de Boer 2000, Oudeyer 2006) and compositionality (Kirby 2000,
De Beule & Bergen 2006). In this section, I will overview previous modelling work re-
lated specifically to “lexical emergence”: that is, the evolutionary linguistic transition
to a one-word stage, as described in Chapter 1. In accordance with my emphasis on
3.3. PREVIOUS MODELS 17
the conceptual bases of words, I organise this overview mainly in terms of conceptual
representations.
3.3.1 Discrete concepts
Many models of language evolution, especially early ones, represent agents’ concepts
as atomic, innate and universal. That is, all agents are equipped with the same set of
discrete meanings.
The earliest example of a lexical emergence model, Hurford (1989) used fixed, shared
sets of both concepts and words. The agents’ task was to converge on the same map-
pings between the two sets. There was no representation of an external environment,
as the agents only interacted with each other. Hurford’s main focus, however, was
on a comparison of learning strategies. In fact, the focus of most models that employ
discrete, atomic concepts is primarily no on lexical emergence itself, but some related
phenomenon. For instance, Smith (2002) studied different word learning biases in a con-
nectionist model, and their effects on the learning, maintenance, and construction of a
lexicon. Models which explore the emergence of compositionality or the evolution of
syntax also tend to use atomic meanings as components in the building of predicate
logic utterances (e.g., Kirby 2000).
Steels (1996a) presented one of the first models in which concepts were not atomic, and
there was no predefined set of word forms. Meanings were represented as vectors,
with each element consisting of a feature type and an associated discrete value. There
were nine possible meanings, one corresponding to each combination of feature values.
Agents developed a shared lexicon by playing “language games”, a paradigm that has
been used in many subsequent models.
It is important to note that in Steels’s (1996a) simulations, referents and concepts are
indistinguishable. Agents perceive objects directly and do not need to convert them into
internal category representations. Since the agents are exposed to the same set of objects,
this means that in effect they trivially have identical conceptual systems consisting of
the same set of discrete meanings. This makes the agents’ task unrealistically simple. In
order to overcome this problem, it is necessary to separate reference from meaning.
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3.3.2 Discrimination trees
Steels (1996b) presents a model in which agents do have private internal category sys-
tems, and categories are grounded in interactions with an external environment of ob-
jects. Objects are represented as vectors of dimension values, with each dimension rep-
resenting an abstract feature, and each value being a number in a continuous range.
Consequently, rather than having discretisations provided to them by the model, agents
must themselves divide a continuous world into categories.
Agent category systems are represented as binary “discrimination trees” in each di-
mension, with the top node representing a dimension’s entire range of [0, 1], and each
other node partitioning its parent node exactly in half. Agents develop their categories
through “discrimination games”, in which they attempt to find or create categories that
can distinguish one object in the environment from the others. Thus, an agent’s category
system gets more refined as it experiences more and more discrimination games.
Steels (1997) integrated the discrimination and language games, so that communicating
about an object requires categorising it in a discrimination game, and this framework
has been subsequently developed by various researchers. Van Looveren (2005) uses
it to explore the transitions between key stages in language evolution. Kaplan (2000)
compares and analyses lexical emergence in various models of different degrees of com-
plexity. Smith (2003a) investigates how lexical emergence is affected when hearers get
no explicit feedback from speakers, as well as the relationship between category system
complexity and communicative success rates.
Although Steels’ framework does satisfy the need to make agents’ conceptual systems
private and environmentally driven, there is still a major problem. The categories of the
agents in Steels’ discrimination trees are entirely of the classical genre: category mem-
bership of an object is a black-and-white issue, determined by whether or not an object is
within the category’s sharp boundaries. Models that are more in line with the psychol-
ogy literature would have more credibility.
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3.3.3 Prototype representations
Compared to models based on the classical view, prototype-based models of lexical
emergence are relatively scarce. Vogt (2000), in a robotics paradigm, used a model in
which categories had associated prototypes, which were represented as points in the
feature space. Category membership of a stimulus is obtained by finding the prototype
in one’s category system which is closest to it. New categories can be created by adding
new prototypes to the space, which effectively splits a previous category in two, much
as in Steels’s (1996b) discrimination trees.
Although there is a sense here in which there are privileged members, and stimuli are
categorised by considering their degree of similarity to all the prototypes, this model is
actually more classical than prototypical. Category membership is still an all-or-nothing
judgement, and there is no sense in which categories overlap each other: rather, they
partition the space along clear-cut boundaries determined by the set of prototypes and
the similarity measure.
Belpaeme (2002) uses a relatively complicated prototype model that does incorporate
the notions of graded membership and overlapping category boundaries. He represents
each category as a radial basis function network (Hassoun 1995), which allows for each
category to have 1 or more prototypes with varying weights (although in a subsequent
model he uses a simplified representation with a single prototype: Belpaeme & Bleys
2005). A prototype is represented with a locally tuned unit, and a stimulus’ similarity to
the prototype is obtained by means of a multivariate gaussian function centred on the
prototype. Although this system is flexible and powerful, the widths of the locally tuned
units are fixed, so that the relevance of all features is constant across all categories. This
idealisation is reasonable in Belpaeme’s (2002) model, which is primarily concerned with
basic colour categories, but is not ideal in general, as it cannot easily handle hierarchical
relationships between categories.
These prototype models use representations that are certainly more psychologically plau-
sible than their classical counterparts. Nevertheless, they still lack the idea of some fea-
tures being more sensitive to others, and, in the case of Belpaeme’s models, are spe-
cialised for a specific purpose.
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3.3.4 Other representations
Although they are not the focus of this study, it is important to point out that atomic, clas-
sical and prototype models are not the only kinds of category representation that have
been used in language evolution models. For example, de Jong (1997) used an adaptive
subspace discrimination method, which fared better in robot categorisation than a proto-
type representation (de Jong & Vogt 1998). Webb (2005) adapts Steels’s (1997) framework
for discrimination and language games, but uses a more psychologically plausible rep-
resentation based on self-organising maps. And Cangelosi & Harnad (2000) use neural
network representations for agents attempting to distinguish categories based on their
perceptual features, with the help of language.
3.3.5 World Structure
Although I have discussed it in the subsections above, it is worth emphasising that most
lexical emergence models have very simple representations of an external environment.
In Steels (1996b), there is a small and finite number of objects, which are in fact already
represented with discrete features. Smith’s (2003a) world is also finite, but object fea-
tures are represented with continuous values. Crucially, these finite worlds are typi-
cally pregenerated, random, and with uncorrelated dimensions, making it possible for
the agents to fine-tune their category systems to fit the world’s idiosyncrasies; indeed,
over the course of many simulations, categories tend to converge on individual objects,
rather than groups of similar ones (Smith 2003a). However, Webb (2005) has shown that
whether the world structure is random or ordered can have significant consequences.
A few models have attempted to use more realistic environments. In his colour-centred
study, Belpaeme (2002) used a set of colour stimuli, which, although finite, was so large
as to be effectively infinite. And models that have been performed with real robots, such
as the Talking Heads experiments (Steels et al. 2002), are implicitly based on a continuous
infinite world, since the robots use real sensory channels to detect objects, which will
appear differently from different angles and different lighting conditions (Vogt 2000).
Unfortunately, in these models, the world is necessarily complex, and it is difficult to




As we have seen, many different lexical emergence models have already been studied.
In considering the large body of results, Steels et al. (2002) compiled a list of conditions
that appear to be required for models to be successful, pertaining to agent interaction,
conceptualisation, signal usage, population structure, and environment representation.
Given some basic prerequisites, the models suggest that lexical emergence could have
occurred through a dynamic process of self-organisation.
However, we must always remember that we are exploring how language actually did
evolve, and not under what conditions it could hypothetically have evolved most effi-
ciently. Although natural selection no doubt played a role in language evolution (Pinker
& Bloom 1990), it does have limits (Lenormand 2002), so we should favour lexical emer-
gence models that are also psychologically plausible over those that simply optimise
communication. It is far from obvious that more psychologically plausible represen-
tations will lead to better results. In fact, Steels et al. (2002) have noted that lexical
emergence occurs relatively slowly in prototype-based models, and that agents do not
converge on a coherent lexicon if the meaning search space is too large. It is possible,
then, that as we make our models more realistic, the results will deteriorate, in which
case, previous conclusions about language evolution based on positive results would
be placed in serious jeopardy. Consequently, in order to gain confidence in the validity
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of the self-organisation hypothesis and ascertain that we are not dealing with false posi-
tives (Allchin 1999), increasingly realistic models must be developed to see if past results
were not due to overly simplistic or idealised assumptions.
In this chapter, I develop such a model, based on a psychologically supported category
representation and a less simplistic but easily modifiable world. If the results are com-
parable to those of past models, then the self-organisation hypothesis will gain further
support and validity. Otherwise, the theory will need to be reevaluated.
The model I will present has two distinguishing features:
1. A prototype category representation, which can handle hierarchical relationships.
2. An infinite and probabilistically structured world, with correlated and continuous
dimension values.
4.2 Overview
In this model, agent categorisation is based on prototype theory and resembles that of
Belpaeme & Bleys (2005). The most important difference is that the dimension sensi-
tivities of categories (i.e., the degree to which deviation of a feature from the proto-
type affects its category membership) are not fixed, but rather reflect the environment
in which categories are acquired and the history of their development. This allows for
some categories and category dimensions to be broader and others narrower, providing
a prototype counterpart for hierarchical categories.
Furthermore, the world in this model is infinite, clumpy and correlated. Rather than
a static world with a small number of predefined objects or meanings, contexts of ob-
jects are generated anew each time, to reflect the fact that no two real-world stimuli are
identical. However, they are not generated completely randomly. Dimension values
have continuous pdfs (probability distribution functions) in which some dimension val-
ues are more likely than others, and there are correlations between the dimensions, in
accordance with the observations made by Mervis & Rosch (1981) (see Section 2.3.2).
In other respects, the model is largely based on previous work. There is a population
of agents who interact with an environment and with each other. The agents have two
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kinds of experiences which bring about changes to their conceptual systems and lexi-
cons: discrimination games and guessing games. In a discrimination game, the concep-
tual system of a single agent develops as it tries to discriminate an object in its environ-
ment. In a guessing game, one agent conveys a word to the hearer for an object in the
common environment, and the hearer tries to figure out which object the speaker was
referring to. The primary objective is to explore under what conditions a population
of agents can converge on a high communicative success rate and a coherent lexicon.
The model has various parameters which affect its structure and behaviour, and differ-
ent conditions can be explored by running simulations with different configurations of
these parameter values.
4.3 The world
4.3.1 Contexts and Objects
Every experience that an agent has is situated in a different environmental context. Each
context is a set of objects, and the number of objects per context is determined by the
parameter conxtsize. A context can be interpreted as the environment that the agent is
currently interacting with.
The objects themselves are defined as vectors of real numbers between 0 and 1. The
number of dimensions and hence the length of these vectors is specified by the parameter
dimnum. Each dimension value is meant to represent an abstract property which can be
used to characterise objects according to a single quantifiable criterion. For example, if
we have a world of 3 dimensions and a context size of 2 objects, then one context might
be {[0.31, 0.72, 0.89], [0.19, 0.76, 0.02]}.
4.3.2 Object generation
Objects in this model are constructed dynamically: objects are generated on the fly
each time a context is needed. However, rather than being random, the dimensions
are “clumpy”: certain dimension values are statistically more likely than others (note
that this sense of clumpy is different than in Smith (2003a), from where I borrow this
term). In addition, values along the different dimensions are partially correlated with
each other. The shape of this structure and the degree of correlation depend on three
24 CHAPTER 4. A NEW MODEL
model parameters pertaining to world structure specifically. Two of these parameters
determine the pdf of dimension values within a single dimension, and the third defines
the degree of correlation between the dimensions.
The parameter dimparts determines how many partitions (or subintervals) the pdf has
within a dimension (note that each dimension has the same distribution of features). The
pdf has a peak in the middle of each partition, and reaches down to zero at its endpoints.
For example, if the value of the parameter is 1, then there will be a strong bias towards
values close to 0.5, with values becoming increasingly unlikely as they approach 0 or 1.
If the value is 10, then the interval [0,1] will be divided into ten partitions (i.e., [0.0,0.1],
[0.1,0.2], ..., [0.9,1.0]), with the probability distribution peaking at the ten midpoints.
dimclump determines how biased the pdf is to the partition midpoints. If the value is
close to 0, then the bias will be extremely small, and the distribution will be nearly uni-
form, with the midpoints of the partitions being only mildly favoured. If the value is
large, then the bias will be large, and the dimension values will mostly be clustered
within very short neighbourhoods of the partition midpoints.
dimcorrel determines the degree of correlation between the dimensions, i.e., the extent to
which different dimension values of the same object will tend to be similar to each other.
If this parameter has a very small value (close to 0), then the dimension values are nearly
independent of each other. On the other hand, if the value is large, then the dimension
values are highly coupled.
Individual objects are generated independently, using a set of random numbers and a
series of mathematical operations. In brief, first an initial random number is created on
the interval [0,1], then a number is chosen for each dimension which is close to the initial
number (due to dimension correlation), and finally these numbers are transformed into
the actual object generation values (depending on world clumpiness). The basic object
generation algorithm is shown in Table 4.1.
The definition of ζ(x) makes sure that the individual oi values are all probabilistically
more likely to be around the centres of the dimension partitions, although how likely
this is depends on the value of dimclump. φr(x) assures that the oi values of an object will
tend to be similar, to an extent determined by the value of dimcorrel. Notice that ζ(x)
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Precondition A probability distribution function ζ(x) has been defined for dimension
clumpiness (determined by the parameters dimclump and dimparts).
Procedure
1. A random number, r, is generated on the interval [0, 1].
2. A probability distribution function, φr(x), is defined for dimension correla-
tion, determined by the values of r and the parameter dimcorrel.
3. A random number, ri, is generated on the interval [0, 1] for each dimension.
4. Each ri is transformed into a value closer to r, ci, in accordance with φr(x).
5. A dimension value is finally obtained for each object dimension by transform-
ing each ci, in accordance with ζ(x).
Table 4.1: Object generation.
is thus fixed for the entire simulation, while phir(x) is defined anew each time a new
object is being created. The precise manner in which these functions are defined and
used is a bit complicated and left deliberately vague here: for full mathematical details,
see Appendix B.
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution functions ζ(x) for one particular world, along with the
generation of four objects. For each object, a random r is found, φr(x) is plotted, and
a chart is shown which shows the steps in object generation, culminating in the object
dimension values. Notice that all of the dimension values for all four objects are fairly
close to the partition centre values. In addition, in most (but not all) cases, the dimension




Agents are equipped with a (possibly empty) private perceptual space and the ability to
create and adapt categories within it. The dimensional structure of an agent’s percep-
tual space is identical to that of the world. In other words, its number of dimensions
is determined by the parameter dimnum, and each dimension spans the interval [0, 1].
Moreover, an agent maps the dimensional values of an object directly onto the same val-
ues in its perceptual space. This implies that there is no subjectivity due to perspective
























 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
r=0.757 dim1 dim2 dim3
ri 0.149 0.966 0.569
ci 0.653 0.797 0.738
oi 0.694 0.727 0.704
r=0.293 dim1 dim2 dim3
ri 0.995 0.810 0.698
ci 0.549 0.373 0.346
















 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
r=0.587 dim1 dim2 dim3
ri 0.934 0.897 0.202
ci 0.650 0.636 0.533
oi 0.694 0.691 0.504
r=0.301 dim1 dim2 dim3
ri 0.154 0.617 0.962
ci 0.283 0.338 0.464
oi 0.298 0.304 0.496
Figure 4.1: Generation of 4 objects: The top graph shows the distribution of a world dimension.
Underneath, the generation of 4 objects is shown, following the algorithm described in Table 4.1.
For each object is shown a plot of the function φr(x) and a table which shows the steps in the
derivation of the object dimension values, oi. The world structure parameters for these examples
were set to dimclump = 10, dimcorrel = 10, dimnum = 3, and dimparts = 5.
or context in perceiving an object’s features. This idealisation makes the task simpler for
the agents, and has a non-trivial impact, as can be seen from experiments with robots,
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in which variability in lighting and perspective do add a good deal of complexity to the
problem of categorisation (Vogt 2000). Nevertheless, it is necessary to make some ide-
alisations in order to restrict the range of phenomena and variables that the model can
hope to explore.
As for the agents’ categories that are defined in these perceptual spaces, it is tempting
to interpret them as concepts, but one must be cautious. In particular, as mentioned
in Section 2.2, features recursively rely on other concepts and features. Indeed, it is
not even clear if the agents’ concepts are more or less basic than the dimensions used
to categorisee them. As a result, it seems more sensible to think of the dimensions as
lower level perceptual or sensory information. For example, one dimension could refer
to sight, another to sound, etc. In that case, the dimensions can really be argued to be
sensory channels (in the sense of Smith (2003a)). However, these kinds of coarse and un-
processed dimensions seem insufficient for developing actual concepts. Therefore, I will
treat the dimensions as relatively low level perceptual features (which is why I refer to a
perceptual rather than a conceptual space), but will generally avoid the use of the term
“concept” in favour of the more vague term “category”, and think of the dimensions and
categories as the perceptual foundations of concepts. I will still sometimes refer to more
complex features in examples, as they tend to be easier to understand.
4.4.2 Category Representation
In order to understand how categories are represented and defined over an agent’s per-
ceptual space, it is useful to first consider how categories work in classically oriented
models. Recall that classical categories do not make distinctions between central and pe-
ripheral members, exhibit no graded membership, and have sharp boundaries. In effect,
when an agent perceives an object from the environment and maps it onto a point in its
perceptual space, it can make black-or-white category membership judgements for the
objects with respect to each of its categories. We can think of each such category, then,
as a binary function over the entire perceptual space, which maps each point to either 0
(not a member) or 1 (a member). This does not mean, however, that every object is only
a member of one category: in hierarchal discrimination trees such as Smith’s (2003a), for
example, an object would be classified as a member of a particular leaf node and all of
that node’s ancestors.
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In the current model, the binary nature of category judgements is replaced with a contin-
uous scale from 0 to 1, in which the higher the value on the scale, the better the category
membership. To consider a concrete example, with respect to a bird category, a sparrow
might get a very high value (e.g., 0.99), a heron somewhat lower (e.g., 0.8), a penguin
lower still (e.g., 0.6), a squirrel quite low (e.g., 0.3), and a rock nearly as low as possi-
ble (e.g., 0.01). Note that in such a system, every object is a member of every category
to some extent, and it is the degree of membership that is crucial. At first, this may
seem counter-intuitive and implausible: after all, how can one claim that a categorisa-
tion system in which squirrels and even rocks are judged to belong, however marginally,
to a bird category, is more realistic than one that makes clear and “correct” judgements?
However, recall that we are dealing here primarily with perceptual features and trying
to match objects to categories. In terms of perceptual characteristics, squirrels certainly
do share certain things in common with birds (such as having two eyes or engaging in
biological motion), and indeed, no one would deny that squirrels are perceptually more
bird-like than rocks.
Moreover, there is little threat of agents classifying rocks as birds for two reasons. First,
as we will see in Section 4.4.3, agents will only use (or create) one category when cate-
gorising an object, and will try to choose the “best” fit, so a category will never be used
for an object when there is a better alternative. Second, and more decisively, in order
to make judgements of when to make new categories and when to use existing ones,
it has been necessary to establish a threshold parameter, memmin, which specifies the
minimum degree of category membership required for an object to actually be matched
to a category. Thus, the concepts in this model do not have entirely fuzzy boundaries.
However, individual dimensions do have fuzzy edges, as the degree of acceptability in a
given dimension depends on the object’s other dimension values, and category bound-
aries may shift over time, due to category adjustments (see Section 4.5.4). This kind of
fuzziness is thus in line with Croft & Cruse’s (2004) view on category boundaries as
being sharp but dynamic.
Let us proceed with technical specifics. A category’s representation consists of two re-
lated parts, a prototype and a set of dimension sensitivities. The prototype refers to a
point in the perceptual space, and specifies the dimension values that identify optimal
members of the category. An object with the same values as the prototype would be
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an example of the category’s prototype, and, as we will see, will exhibit the maximum
possible degree of category membership (i.e., 1).
Every category also has a set of dimension sensitivities, one for each dimension. A di-
mension sensitivity determines the extent to which deviations between an object’s di-
mension value and the corresponding prototype dimension value affect the object’s cate-
gory membership. To give a real-world example, if we were judging whether something
is a ball, we would consider shape and perhaps texture as very important, but not size.
On the other hand, colour would be more important when classifying snow, while shape
less so. The snow category would thus have a significantly higher dimension sensitivity
in the colour dimension than the ball category.
4.4.3 Calculating Category Membership
A category can thus be thought of as a list of pairs of numbers which determine category
membership over every point in the agent’s perceptual space. For the purposes of our
model, we require a precise membership measure with three properties:
• One point (the prototype) should yield the value 1.
• All other points should decrease around the prototype, symmetrically in each di-
mension.
• The rate at which the function drops in each dimension depends on the corre-
sponding dimension sensitivity.
A good function with these properties in a single dimension, with support in the psy-







A plot of the gaussian function is given in Figure 4.2, with µ = 0.4 and σ = 0.2. The peak
is at µ, and the speed at which it decreases is faster if σ is smaller. For our purposes,
we can interpret µ as the prototype value and σ as the dimension sensitivity or width
(keeping in mind that a high sensitivity corresponds to a small value of σ).
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Figure 4.2: G(x): A gaussian function, with µ = 0.4 and σ = 0.1.
For the general case of multiple dimensions, one can use a multivariate gaussian function
with diagonal covariances. However, in order to normalise for the number of dimen-
sions (so that higher dimensional cases do not intrinsically yield lower category mem-
berships), the N th root of the gaussian function’s value is taken, where N is dimnum.
Therefore, the category membership function used to determine the degree of member-
















where i identifies a dimension, with oi being the object value, pi the prototype value,
and si the sensitivity. Notice that this function also has a maximum of 1 (when all object
dimension values match the prototype) and never descends all the way to 0. An exam-
ple of membershipc(o) for an agent’s category in a perceptual space of two dimensions
is shown in Figure 4.3. Note the greater sensitivity of the function (i.e., the faster de-
cline) along the x-axis than along the y-axis. Also, the object’s value lies above the plane
defined by memmin, so this category could potentially be used to categorize the object.
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Note also the greater sensitivity of the function (i.e., the faster decline) along the x-axis


















Figure 4.3: Category membership in 2 dimensions: membershipc(o), the category membership
function for an agent’s category c in a conceptual space of two dimensions, with p0 = 0.4, s0 =
0.05, p1 = 0.6, and s1 = 0.1. The blue plane shows the value of the memmin, and the light blue
dot indicates the object being categorised: since the dot is above the plane, the object can be
considered to be a member of the category.
It is more difficult to visualise category membership with more than two dimensions,
but Figure 4.4 shows an example of a category in five dimensions, with the gaussian
function for each dimension plotted independently on the same graph.
An example of a category member calculation with the category in Figure 4.4 applied to
the object [0.12, 0.2, 0.51, 0.65, 0.9] is shown in Figure 4.5. Each object dimension value
is shown with a line from the x-axis to where it meets the corresponding gaussian curve
for that dimension (in the same colour). Notice that along one dimension (the grey one),
the object matches the prototype perfectly. Also, the graph shows how the dimension
sensitivities play an important role: the example object’s fit for the category is the worst
in the category’s most sensitive dimension (the blue one), despite its value being closest
to the prototype value in that dimension. In contrast, the object’s dimension value is
relatively far from the prototype in the category’s least sensitive dimension (the green
one), but this is of little consequence, since the curve decreases so slowly. The gaussian
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Figure 4.4: A 5-dimensional category: The category structure of a single category in a 5-
dimensional perceptual space, with (left peak to right peak) p0 = 0.1, s0 = 0.05, p1 = 0.3,
s1 = 0.3, p2 = 0.5, s2 = 0.01, p3 = 0.6, s3 = 0.1, p4 = 0.9, s4 = 0.1. The one-dimensional
gaussian functions corresponding to each dimension are plotted independently.
values in the five dimensions (from left to right on the graph) are 0.9231, 0.9460, 0.6065,
0.8825, and 1.0. Multiplying these together and taking the fifth root yields a category
membership of 0.8621. If this is above the value of memmin and if it wins out over other
categories, then this category is used to categorize the object.
4.4.4 Words
Each category is associated with a list of words, and each such association has a score
attached to it. (This list can also be empty, in which case the category has not yet been
lexicalised.) Thus, in this model, words are considered to be dependent on prerequisite
categories: an agent’s “lexicon” is embedded in its category system. If a category would
be forgotten, for example (although that does not happen in this model), then the word
would be lost as well.
Unlike categories, the representations used for words is extremely simple. They are
strings of three characters with a consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) structure (for a total
of 21×5×21 = 2205 possible distinct words), which are treated as discrete and symbolic.
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Figure 4.5: Category membership in 5 dimensions: The same category as in Figure 4.4 is plotted
here, along with colour-matching dimension values for an object being categorised. The example
object here has dimension values [0.12, 0.2, 0.51, 0.65, 0.9]. Applying the gaussians, and then
taking the 5th root of their product gives a category membership of 0.8621.
In addition, agents always both produce and perceive words perfectly. Consequently,
words like “kes” and “kez” are no closer together in any sense than “kes” and “wum”.
Notice that this system, although simplistic, has potential counterparts for human lan-
guage relationships, including synonymy, homonymy and polysemy. If two or more
words are associated with one category, they are synonyms. If the same word is associ-
ated with two or more related or overlapping categories, they are arguably polysemous.
And if two very different categories have the same word attached to them, then they




The discrimination games used in this model are based on the design developed by
Steels (1996b). The fundamental objective and setup has been preserved, but some changes
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have been made to the implementation, most of which are due to the prototype repre-
sentation used here.
A discrimination game is a strictly private experience, involving a single agent and a
world context. The agent’s task is to select an object from the context at random (which
I will call the topic), and uniquely categorize it, i.e., to find (or create, if necessary) a
category which fits the topic but fails to fit the other context objects. Depending on the
agent’s current set of categories, the topic and the context, the agent will perform one of
the three following operations: create an entirely new category, split off a new category
from an existing one, or adjust an existing category.
Before explaining the procedure that establishes which operation is performed, I intro-
duce two terms:
candidate category A category c is a candidate category for an object o if o’s degree of
membership in c is sufficient for it to be classified in that category. Recall that this
condition amounts to membershipc(o) >= memmin.
distinguishing category A category c is a distinguishing category for an object o if c is
a candidate category of o and c is not a candidate category for any other object in
the context (Smith 2003a).
The following procedure is used to determine which of the three operations above is
used by the agent during a discrimination game. First, the agent searches its conceptual
system and builds a list of all of the topic’s candidate categories. If this list is empty, it
means that no category is good enough to classify the object, and the agent must create
an entirely new category. Otherwise, the agent searches the topic’s candidate categories
for distinguishing categories. If successful, it chooses the one with the highest mem-
bership, and this category is then adjusted to better fit the topic relative to the other
context objects. If there are no distinguishing categories, then the agent finds the candi-
date category which has the most sensitive dimensions, by calculating the product of the
dimension sensitivities for each category and choosing the one for which this product
is the smallest. An even finer category is then created by creating a subcategory of this
one. A formalised description of this algorithm is shown in Table 4.2.
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Precondition An agent with a set of categories C is presented with a context O.
Procedure
1. Choose a topic object ot randomly from O.
2. Find the set of candidate categories Cc for ot (which is a subset of C).
3. IfCc is empty, add a new category, and terminate. Otherwise, move on to step
4.
4. Find the set of discriminating categories Cd for ot (which is a subset of Cc).
5. If Cd is empty, find the category cs in Cc which has the most sensitive dimen-
sions, split off a new subcategory from cs, and terminate. Otherwise, move
on to step 6.
6. Find the category ca in Cd which maximises membershipca(ot), adjust ca, and
terminate.
Table 4.2: Discrimination algorithm.
4.5.2 Creating a new category
When creating an entirely new category, both the topic and context play an important
role, while the set of already established categories is irrelevant. The prototype’s dimen-
sion values are taken directly from those of the topic, so that the topic would be given
a category membership of 1 in the category, regardless of the dimension sensitivities or
the other preexisting categories.
The calculation of the dimension sensitivities, on the other hand, is a little more compli-
cated, and involves both the topic and the rest of the context. The idea is to use sensitiv-
ities which will guarantee that the other context objects will not qualify for membership
in the new category, and yet not make the sensitivities too small, as this might make
the category too restrictive to be of much use in the future. The strategy employed here
to achieve this is to choose each dimension sensitivity si independently in such a way
that if we were dealing with a one-dimensional world consisting of only the dimension
i, then even the closest other object in the context would not pass the category mem-
bership threshold (falling short by a ratio determined by the parameter adjustrat). This
is done by solving the 1-dimensional category membership function (which is just the
1-dimensional Gaussian function given in Equation 4.1) for si, with pi set to the topic
value oti (as this will become the prototype value), and the membership set tomemconxt.
36 CHAPTER 4. A NEW MODEL
This parameter thus determines what the sensitivity of a dimension will be set to given
the dimension values of the other context objects.
si =




We then independently obtain the si for each dimension in this way, and this will guar-
antee that every non-topic object in the context will have a membership of at most
memconxt(a mathematical proof of this claim is shown in Appendix C).
4.5.3 Splitting off a new subcategory
Recall that subcategories are split off when a discrimination game finds that the agent
has candidate categories for the topic, but no distinguishing categories. In this case, the
agent looks for its most sensitive category, and splits off a new subcategory from it.
The most sensitive category cs is defined to be the one for which the product of its di-
mension sensitivities is minimised, i.e.,






On the basis of this category, a new category is created. First, the dimension is sought
in which the topic is most unlike each of the other context objects. In particular, in each
dimension, we find the minimum difference between the topic value and the other di-
mension values, and then choose the dimension along which this difference is the largest:
i = arg max
i∈{1,...,N}
(min |oti − oi|) (4.5)
i is the dimension along which the split is performed. The new category is defined as
a subcategory of cs by inheriting the prototype values and dimension sensitivities in all
the dimensions except i. As for dimension i, its prototype and dimension values are
calculated just as those of an entirely new category (see the preceding section).
4.5. DISCRIMINATION GAMES 37
Notice that this calculation is guaranteed to make the new category a better fit for the
topic than the superordinate category it was derived from. On the other hand, although
very unlikely, it is not strictly guaranteed to make the new category a discriminating
category for the topic, or even that the new category will have more sensitive dimensions
than the category it was derived from. For computational reasons, further calculations
which would turn this unlikelihood into impossibility have been avoided.
4.5.4 Adjusting an existing category
When at least one discriminating category is found for the topic object, then no new cate-
gory needs to be added, and the agent only makes minor adjustments to the category, in
order to make it fit the topic better relative to the context. I have already explained how
discriminating categories are found: here I explain how these adjustments are made.
Having chosen the discriminating category for which the topic object’s membership is
maximised, the agent adjusts its prototype value and dimension sensitivity in each di-
mension independently.
A prototype’s dimension value is shifted towards the topic object value. But by how
much? Certainly, the amount of shift should depend on the distance between the topic
and prototype dimension values. If the topic and prototype are equal, then the shift
should be 0, and the larger the distance between them, the greater the shift should be,
without of course ever actually being larger than the distance. However, since in this
model the dimension sensitivities are not fixed (as they are in Belpaeme (2002), for ex-
ample), and the importance of the distance between prototype and object values with
regards to determining category membership depends on them, they should have an ef-
fect on the amount of shift as well. For example, if prototype and topic are 0.05 apart in
a particular dimension, then this will have little impact (and thus little need for adjust-
ment) if the dimension sensitivity has a high value like 0.3, but will be very significant if
the sensitivity is only, say, 0.01. As a result, the particular function that has been chosen
to calculate the amount of shift is a function of the distance between the prototype and
topic values, and the ratio of this distance over the dimension sensitivity:
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,where di = |pi − ti| and ri = disi (4.6)
Note that when di = 0, shifti = 0, and as ri gets larger and larger, shifti asymptotically
approaches di.
Once the amount of shift required is calculated, the prototype’s dimension value is up-
dated accordingly. Table 4.3 shows the resultant values for a fixed prototype starting
value of 0.6, and topic values and dimension sensitivities covering a range of values.
Note how the changes are larger for smaller values of si (i.e., larger dimension sensi-
tivities), and that even in such cases, the shift is usually quite small. Also, not all com-
binations of the variables are relevant, because if ri is large, then the gaussian function
would yield a tiny value, in which case the topic would never have been identified as a
member of the category. Accordingly, values corresponding to large ratios (i.e., ri > 4)
are not shown in the table.
si\ti 0.400 0.425 0.450 0.475 0.500 0.525 0.550 0.575 0.600
0.025 0.471 0.486 0.495 0.499 0.500 0.501 0.505 0.514 0.529
0.050 0.483 0.492 0.498 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.508 0.517
0.075 0.488 0.495 0.498 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.505 0.512
0.100 0.491 0.496 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.504 0.509
0.125 0.493 0.497 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.503 0.507
0.150 0.494 0.497 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.503 0.506
0.175 0.495 0.498 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.502 0.505
0.200 0.495 0.498 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.502 0.505
Table 4.3: Prototype shifting: Example of what values a category prototype in dimension i
would be shifted to from a value of 0.5 for various possible combinations of topic dimensions
ti and dimension sensitivities si (rounded to 3 decimal points).
Having adjusted the prototype centre for a dimension, the agent then adjusts the cor-
responding dimension sensitivity. The guiding idea here is that, just as in category
creation, any adjustment of the category sensitivities should aim towards making the
topic more distinguishable from the other context objects. In contrast with the category
creation and splitting cases, however, the topic is not used as a model to create a new
prototype, and so the topic and prototype values will differ as well. In addition, the ad-
justments should not be too large, since otherwise the category’s structure changes dras-
tically with each adjustment, leading to an unstable conceptual system. Consequently,
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adjustment occurs using the new dimension sensitivity calculation (Equation (4.3)) based
on the non-topic context objects, and a parameter which affects how much this calcula-
tion should affect the adjustment.
In particular, a target dimension sensitivity, sitarget , is calculated based on the non-topic
context objects in exactly the same manner as in the cases of creating a new category or
subcategory (i.e., using Equation (4.3)). This time, however, the result does not deter-
mine the dimension sensitivity independently, but only plays a role in a larger calcula-
tion. The extent by which the actual category’s sensitivity is changed towards this target
is determined by the parameter adjustrat. If adjustrat = 0.0, then the sensitivity is not
changed at all, making the above calculations in fact unnecessary. If adjustrat = 1.0, then
the sensitivity is set to sitarget. For intermediate values of adjustrat, the new sensitivity
is an interpolation between the old one and the target. In short, the new sensitivity is
calculated and updated by:






In this section, I will demonstrate the mechanisms of the discrimination game by looking
at individual games in a single run of discrimination games. In order to facilitate visu-
alisation and avoid clutter, I have used a run with only a one-dimension and a context
size of two (i.e., dimnum = 1 and conxtsize = 2). The other relevant parameters used in
this example were: memmin = 0.8, memconxt = 0.1, adjustrat = 0.5, dimclump = 10.0 and
dimparts = 5.
Each figure below consists of two graphs, showing one discrimination game. The x-axis
shows dimension values, and the y-axis indicates category membership. The agent’s
category representations are shown with blue gaussian curves, while the context object
dimension values are indicated with vertical green lines, with the topic specified further
with a vertical text label. The left graph shows the agent’s set of categories before the
discrimination game, while the right graph (b) shows the same set after modification
via the discrimination game. As a result, each (b) graph contains either one more curve
than the corresponding (a) graph (if a new category was created or split off), or the
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same number of curves but with one curve altered (if an existing category was adjusted).
Finally, the graphs also show the parameters memmin with a horizontal red line, and
memconxt with a horizontal light blue line.
Figure 4.6 shows what happens in an agent’s very first discrimination game, provided it
has not been equipped with any innate categories (as was the case in all the simulations
investigated here). In (a), the agent does not yet have any categories, so it must create
one. The new category shown in (b) has a peak at the topic’s dimension value. Since the
dimension sensitivity has been calculated according to Equation (4.4)), the nearest object
to the topic (in a context size of 2 like here, this is just trivially the non-topic object) has a
membership of memconxt.
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Figure 4.6: Discrimination game example: Adding the first category.
The immediately following discrimination game is shown in Figure 4.7. The agent starts
with the single category system that resulted from the first discrimination game. The
topic’s category membership is clearly inadequate in the category: in the graph, this can
be clearly seen by noting that the topic’s green line intersects the blue category curve
much lower than the red memmin line. Consequently, just as in the first discrimination
game, it creates a new category. Note that in this case, the new category’s dimension
sensitivity is much stronger, because the topic and other context object’s value varied by
a lesser extent. The agent’s category sensitivity thus reflects the degree of discrimination
that was required when it was created.
In the next game (Figure 4.8), the topic is coincidentally quite similar to what it was in the
previous game, around 0.5 (although not entirely coincidentally, since the world struc-
ture parameters make 0.5 a relatively likely object dimension value: see Section 4.3.2).
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Figure 4.7: Discrimination game example: Adding another category.
The category then created is thus an excellent fit for the current topic, while matching
the other object very poorly. As a result, in this case, the category adjustment mechanism
is followed. First, the category centre is shifted slightly in the direction of the topic, as de-
fined in Equation (4.6). The shift is virtually indiscernible, however, since the topic and
prototype are extremely close, and the dimension sensitivity is not too strong. Next, the
dimension sensitivity is modified. A potential dimension sensitivity (according to Equa-
tion 4.4) is calculated which would give the non-topic object a membership of memconxt,
and the category’s sensitivity is updated according to Equation (4.7). Note that the sen-
sitivity does not get changed so much that the non-topic object’s membership actually
reaches memconxt. This would have occurred had adjustrat been set to 1, but as it is
only 0.5, the shift only occurs part of the way there. The net result of this discrimination
game is thus that we still have two categories, but that one has become wider, reflecting
the fact that it has now been used in a situation which required less discrimination than
before.
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Figure 4.8: Discrimination game example: Widening a category.
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Figure 4.9 shows an example of what happens when there is a context object whose
dimension value is very close to that of the topic. A very strong degree of dimension
sensitivity is required in this case, so the resultant category is extremely thin. Note,
however, that if the agent ever uses this category again, it is likely to encounter it in a
more merciful context, in which case the category will be broadened significantly in a
category adjustment like the one above.
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Figure 4.9: Discrimination game example: Adding a narrow category.
The next figure (4.10) represents a discrimination several games later, and is an example
of a category splitting off. As in the previous case, the other context object and topic
dimension values are very close. In this case, they both have sufficient membership in
the rightmost category, making that a candidate but not discriminating category for the
topic. A subcategory is therefore created. However, for a 1-dimensional case like the one
exemplified here, it is worth noting that splitting off a category and adding a new cate-
gory actually do exactly the same thing. Recall from Section 4.5.3 that when a category
is split off, all prototype values and dimension sensitivities except one are copied to it
from its parent, while the last is treated as for new categories. But of course, when there
is only one dimension, it means that nothing is copied from the parent. Nevertheless,
we do end up with a category which can be called a subcategory, in that it is much like a
more refined version of its parent.
Finally, Figure 4.11 shows the 500th discrimination game in this run. A large number
of categories have been built, with varying degrees of sensitivity. Note, however, that
the prototypes cluster around the values 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9, which are precisely the
midpoints of the world partitions.
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Figure 4.10: Discrimination game example: Splitting a category.
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Figure 4.11: Discrimination game example: After 500 discrimination games.
When there are more than three dimensions, things become more complicated and more
difficult to visualise. Due to lack of space, I will not discuss examples in multiple di-
mensions here, but the reader is invited to study Figures 4.12 and 4.13, which show the
1st through 9th and the 500th discrimination games for one run, with the same param-
eter values as in the previous example, except that dimnum = 3 and dimclump = 10. For
compactness, I show only the result of each discrimination game.
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Figure 4.12: Discrimination game examples with 3 dimensions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th dis-
crimination games.
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Figure 4.13: Discrimination game examples with 3 dimensions: 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 500th
discrimination games.
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4.6 Guessing Games
In addition to discrimination games, agents also engage in social linguistic interactions
with each other. Since these games are not dependent on the representation used for ob-
jects or categories, the algorithm used here closely follows Steels’s (2001) guessing game,
which is one of several related language games (Vogt & Coumans 2003). Consequently,
I will describe this aspect of the model only very briefly. A formalised outline of the
algorithm is given in Table 4.4.
Precondition A speaker agentAs and a hearer agentAh are presented with a contextO.
Procedure
1. As chooses a topic object ot randomly from O.
2. As carries out a discrimination game on the ot, obtaining a category cs.
3. As utters a word w to express cs.
4. Ah finds the best fit, if any, between w, a context object, og, and a category, cg .
5. If og = ot, then the game is a success.
6. Otherwise, if og 6= ot (or if no og was found), then the game is a failure. The
speaker points out ot to the hearer, and the hearer carries out a discrimination
game on ot to obtain a category ch.
7. cs, cg and ch are updated based in accordance with the success or failure of
the game.
Table 4.4: Guessing game algorithm.
Steps 1 and 2 are identical to what happens for the discrimination game with a topic ot,
yielding a category cs. In Step 3, the agent checks whether there are words associated
with cs. If there are, it utters the one with the strongest association to cs. If there aren’t,
it invents a random word and utters it.
The hearer’s task in Step 4 is the most difficult and computationally expensive. It first
finds the set of all of its categories which have w associated with them, Cw. If there are
no such categories, the guessing game is a failure. Otherwise, it finds the category cg in
Cw and the object og in the context for which the membership is maximised, i.e.,
(cg, og) = arg max
(c∈Cw ,o∈O)
(membershipc(o)) . (4.8)
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However, if membershicg(og) < memmin, then cg does not qualify as a candidate cate-
gory for og, and the guessing game fails. Otherwise, the hearer indicates its guess og to
the speaker.
In Step 5, the speaker then checks trivially whether the guess object is the topic. If it is, the
game is a success. Otherwise, the speaker corrects the hearer by pointing to the topic. In
that case, the hearer undergoes a discrimination game with the topic and context objects
and obtains a category ch (i.e., the same game that the speaker underwent in Step 2).
Once the guessing game ends, both speaker and hearer update their lexicon. This means
updating the word associations of the agent’s discrimination category cs, the hearer’s
guessed category ch, and, if the hearer failed to guess or guessed incorrectly, the hearer’s
discrimination category cg. The specific adjustments made to each category depend on
whether the guessing game was successful and whether the wordw is already associated
with the category. Figure 4.14 lists the exact changes that are made.
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Success Failure
If w ∈ csW ,
∀v ∈ csW , va =
{
va + 1 if v = w
va − 1 if v 6= w
.
Otherwise,
csW = csW ∪ {w}
wa = 0.
If w ∈ csW ,
∀v ∈ csW , va =
{
va − 1 if v = w
va + 1 if v 6= w
.
Otherwise,
csW = csW ∪ {w}
wa = 0.
∀v ∈ cgW , va =
{
va + 1 if v = w
va − 1 if v 6= w
. ∀v ∈ cgW , va =
{
va − 1 if v = w
va + 1 if v 6= w
.
If w ∈ chW ,
∀v ∈ csW , va =
{
va + 1 if v = w
va − 1 if v 6= w
.
Otherwise,
csW = csW ∪ {w}
wa = 0.
Figure 4.14: Lexical adjustments: Adjustments made to category word associations after a
guessing game, depending on whether the game was a failure or not. cW denotes the set of
word associations of category c, w is the word used in the guessing game, cs is the resultant cate-
gory of the speaker’s discrimination game, cg is the category that the hearer used in the guessing
(if the hearer did make a guess), and ch is the resultant category of the hearer’s discrimination




In this chapter, I will present the results of simulations. All simulations have been run
with the model described in Chapter 4, but under various sets of conditions, as defined
by different parameter configurations (see Appendix A for a summary of the model pa-
rameters).
With the exception of Section 5.3.6, all of the simulations consisted solely of a large num-
ber of guessing games. A simulation consists of a sequence of epochs, each of which
contains 100 guessing games. The number of epochs in a simulation is defined by the
parameter epochnum. For each epoch, the communicative success rate, κ, is defined as
the ratio of the number of successful guessing games within the epoch. Plots of κ over
the full set of epochs are used to demonstrate how the communicative success of the
population changes. In order to obtain a single number that measures the final commu-
nicative success rate of a simulation, κ is defined as the average of κ over the final 10
epochs of a simulation. Another value that is sometimes given is λ, which is the average
number of categories per agent at the end of the simulation, giving a simple idea of the
complexity of the agents’ category systems.
Due to space constraints, the results given here are not comprehensive, but give only a
suggestive sample of what the model might reveal. In addition, recall that the model has
quite a number of parameters, all of which can theoretically take an infinite number of
different values. As a result, the parameter space is very large, and it is impossible to
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search through all possible combinations of parameter values. Therefore, although many
important patterns will most likely be missed, it is necessary here to limit the scope and
methodology of the exploration.
The remainder of this chapter is thus organised in four sections. First, I will investigate
how the model works in a few simple cases in some detail, in order to have a baseline that
other results can be compared to. Second, I will briefly investigate the effects of each of
the parameters, by varying one or two at a time, while keeping the others constant. These
investigations will be extremely short, and are meant to be suggestive of the model’s
potential. Third, I will make a brief attempt at comparing agents’ conceptual structures,
and relating them to communicative success. Finally, I will look at a single word in a
single simulation and survey the agents’ categories which are associated with it.
5.2 Base cases
The model here uses a relatively complex representation of both world structure and
agents’ category systems. Consequently, the first issue to explore is whether a popu-
lation of agents can even communicate successfully at all under the simplest possible
conditions.
Accordingly, the first set of simulations was performed with a very simple parameter
configuration. A completely random world (i.e., dimclump = 0) was used with only
1 dimension, and minimal population and context sizes of 2 each. The other parame-
ters were set to values which generally worked well in preliminary experiments (note
that the parameters unmentioned here have no effect when the world is random and
1-dimensional): memmin = 0.9, conxtsize = 0.1, and adjustrat = 0.0. Fifty simulations
with these parameter settings were run, each consisting of 200 epochs. Figure 5.1 shows
the communicative success rate of the runs, κ, over the epochs, overlaid on one graph
(only 20 runs are shown to reduce clutter).
It is evident that under these simplistic conditions, the agents quickly converge on a very
high communicative success rate. In all the simulations, κ quickly reached 90% within
5 epochs (i.e., 500 guessing games). And in the majority of the runs, κ reached 95% and
stayed close to it. For a few runs, communication would occasionally dip a little for some
epochs, but even then κ did not drop below around 90%.
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Figure 5.1: Random 1-dimensional world: κ for 20 superimposed runs under very simple con-
ditions, with 2 agents and 2 context objects.
These, however, are the results from using a completely random world. What happens
if, in contrast, we take a highly clumpy world? Figure 5.2 shows the results with nearly
the same parameter values as for Figure 5.1, but with dimclump = 100 and dimparts = 5.
In this case also, convergence is even faster and communicative success even higher than
in the random case. Table 5.1 shows the average and standard deviation of both κ and
λ for each of the two plotted cases (but using 50 runs each). Four other versions of a
structured world are also tabulated, based on different values for dimparts.
dimclump dimparts κ λ
0 N/A 98.0 0.9 323 11
100 1 99.2 0.3 325 13
100 2 99.2 0.3 326 13
100 5 99.2 0.3 340 10
100 20 99.0 0.4 394 12
100 100 98.9 0.3 303 12
Table 5.1: 1-dimensional world: Mean and standard deviation κ and λ values over 50 simulation
runs in a 1-dimensional world under different world structure conditions.
It should be noted that dimclump (and dimcorrel as well) can theoretically take any value
in [0,∞), but the mathematical calculations require higher and higher precision as the
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Figure 5.2: Clumpy 1-dimensional world: κ for 20 superimposed runs under very simple con-
ditions, with 2 agents and 2 context objects, in a clumpy world with 5 partitions.
value goes up, and will eventually break down when using computers (for instance, in-
correct calculations were very much in evidence when this parameter was set at around
500).
It is not difficult to imagine why a clumpy world is more conducive to better communica-
tion. In such a world, an agent’s many category centres will tend to be found coinciding
with the probabilistically dense areas of the world’s structure. When dimparts = 5, many
of the categories prototypes were clustered around the midpoints of the world’s dimen-
sion’s partitions. Since different agents interact with the same world, they both end up
with roughly the same kind of structure to their category system. On the other hand,
when the world structure is totally random, the agent’s category systems will depend
largely on their personal discrimination game histories. Consequently, there need be a
priori no similarity between the agents’ category systems. In light of this, it is surprising
that agents still manage to reach a high κ. However, here they only need to distinguish
between two objects, and they are still likely over time to associate words with categories
that are similar to the lexicalised categories of the other agent.
Notice that the number of partitions in the world’s one dimension didn’t affect the results
significantly. There is perhaps a slight drop in κ as the number of partitions goes up, but
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this difference might not be statistically significant. Indeed, regardless of the number of
partitions, κ is clearly larger than it is for the random world. This is interesting because
we can take the number of partitions as a parallel to the number of objects in models with
finite pregenerated worlds. For instance, in a highly clumpy one-dimensional world
with five partitions, generated objects tend strongly to have dimension values very close
to 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. In other words, there are 5 “natural kinds” in our world,
with some variation within each kind. From this perspective, we might imagine that the
more partitions we have, the more natural kinds there are in the world. Having more
partitions makes it more likely that context objects will belong to different natural kinds,
and thus should facilitate discrimination. On the other hand, having more basic natural
kinds makes it less likely that individual natural kinds will be deeply divided up into
subcategories. As a result, when two objects do fall in the same partition, the system
with fewer natural kinds will tend to handle them more successfully. The results here
suggest that these two arguments more or less cancel each other out.
Perhaps surprisingly, communicative rates reach high levels even when there is only one
partition. In such a world, each context is virtually guaranteed to present agents with
very similar objects. Indeed, it is not at first obvious how a highly clumpy world with
only one partition is different from a compressed version of a random world. However,
even within the single partition, the world does have a bias towards its centre (0.5), and
thus a structure, from which the agents appear to be benefiting.
Also, the number of categories that agents create is consistently between around 300 and
400, for all partition values, as well as the random world. This shows that a random
world does not need more categories to discriminate objects from each other. The cat-
egories may be distributed differently when the world is clumpy, but then the agents
need to make finer distinctions among similar objects. This result also shows that the
stability of the category system is not related directly to communicative effectiveness.
However, a one-dimensional world is ultimately not very interesting, especially since
this model is concerned with investigating the effects of both dimension correlations
and clumpiness in the world on agents’ communication. In most of the simulation runs
presented in this chapter, three dimensions have been used. This number has been cho-
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sen because it is enough to investigate the effects of dimension correlations, but not so
much as to lead to overly complex and time-consuming computations.
Figure 5.3 shows the results of 20 simulation runs for each of four 3-dimensional world
types, varying between extremes in both clumpiness and dimension correlation. Since
I will use the same world structures in subsequent sections, I give these worlds names:
Wr for a completely random world with no clumpiness and no dimension correlation
(dimcorrel = 0, dimclump = 0), Wo for a highly correlated world with no clumpiness
(dimcorrel = 100, dimclump = 0), Wl for a highly clumpy world with no dimension cor-
relations (dimcorrel = 0, dimclump = 100), and Ws for a highly structured that is both
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Figure 5.3: 3-dimensional worlds: κ for 20 superimposed runs in different world structures.
In all four cases, a high degree of communicative success is reached quickly and main-
tained, comparably to the 1-dimensional case. It is perhaps surprising that communi-
cation has not deteriorated much with more dimensions, as the world structure is more
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complex. However, note that this higher complexity also allows for more variation be-
tween objects, which facilitates discrimination. Objects can have very similar values in
two dimensions, but a greater difference in the third dimension may be enough to make
them easily distinguished.
Table 5.2 shows averages over 50 runs for the four worlds depicted in Figure 5.3. As
the tables suggest and can be vaguely seen on the graphs, a higher degree of world
clumpiness helps communicative success get a little better, as it did in the 1-dimensional
case.
World dimcorrel dimclump κ λ
Wr 0 0 96.3 0.7 505 29
Wo 0 100 98.9 0.4 343 15
Wl 100 0 96.6 1.4 281 10
Ws 100 100 99.1 0.5 331 12
Table 5.2: 3-dimensional world: Mean and standard deviation κ and λ values over 50 simulation
runs in different world structures.
On the other hand, the effect of dimension correlation appears to be marginal in these
cases. This may be because dimension correlation introduces a trade-off: you get a
more structured and predictable world, but you also get significantly less variation.
For instance, if the dimensions have 5 partitions, then an uncorrelated but clumpy 3-
dimensional world would have, from an objective point of view, 125 (53) different gen-
eral kinds of objects, one corresponding to each combination of partition centres across
the three dimensions. But if the world was instead highly correlated, then only 5 of those
125 kinds would occur often (i.e., those for which the dimension values fell in the same
partitions). We will see later, however, that dimension correlation does make a difference
under some other conditions.
5.3 Parameter Effects
5.3.1 Population size
The simulations in the preceding section involved populations of only two agents. How-
ever, humans and other primates are highly social animals who live in groups. This
section explores how communicative success is affected by larger populations.
56 CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
Figure 5.4 plots the effects of population size under four different world structures. Each
graph shows one run of 500 epochs each for population sizes of 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, and
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Figure 5.4: Varying popsize in four different world structures.
Less obviously, high dimension correlation appears to have a significant effect on the rate
of convergence, especially with higher populations. When the correlation is high (i.e., in
Wo and Ws), κ reaches 70% within a few epochs, even in a very clumpy world with 128
agents. In contrast, when there is no dimension correlation, κ does not reach 70% until
about 250 epochs in the random world and over 50 in the clumpy one. However, note
that κ eventually does win out in the uncorrelated cases, while the correlated cases seem
to reach a plateau. These effects can be seen in Figure 5.5, where the same runs for the
four world types are plotted together on one graph each for the smallest (2) and largest
(128) population sizes.
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Figure 5.5: Population sizes and world structures: The left graph shows κ for 2 agents in four
different world structures, and the right shows the same thing for 128 agents.
5.3.2 Context size
If agents’ joint attention skills are not very advanced, they may need to choose from
amongst a larger set of context objects to ascertain what speaking conspecifics are refer-
ring to. Figure 5.6 shows the effect of increasing context size in the four different world
structures we have considered above.
As the graphs reveal, increasing context size deteriorates communication, and does so
more significantly than increasing population size. However, this effect is more pro-
nounced for uncorrelated worlds: correlated worlds appear to be relatively robust to
larger contexts.
The reason for this appears to be related to the number of categories that agents create.
In the runs shown here with context sizes of 16, λ was 42,427 and 38,176 for the two un-
correlated worlds, as opposed to only 1798 and 2682 for the two correlated ones. Since
the simulations consisted of 50,000 guessing games (500 epochs of 100 games each), this
means that in the uncorrelated cases, the discrimination games were resulting in the cre-
ation or splitting off of new categories around 80% of the time. But in any game when
a category is just being created, it has not yet been lexicalised, so the game is guaran-
teed to fail. So the question becomes why context size should have such a deleterious
effect on the discrimination game in an uncorrelated world. This result requires further
investigation.
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Figure 5.6: Varying conxtsize in four different world structures. Note that simulations with
context sizes beyond 16 were not run for Wr and Wl, because results were already very poor
with 16.
5.3.3 World Structure
The simulations that I have presented so far have been run in somewhat extreme world
structures, in order to investigate what effect the object generation parameters might
have when other parameters are varied. But we should expect that the structure of our
perceived world probably has a structure that lies somewhere in between. Dimensions
are correlated, but not to the point where they match perfectly (e.g., most birds fly, but
some do not). And some dimension values are more likely than others (e.g., animals
typically have an even number of legs, unless they are injured). Of course, it is absurd to
claim that the natural world corresponds to any specific values of these two parameters,
since they are already idealisations in other ways (e.g., each dimension’s distribution
is identical). Nevertheless, if we grant that dimension correlation and clumpiness in
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the world is substantial but not extreme, then it is important to look at how the model
behaves with intermediate values for dimclump and dimcorrel.
Table 5.3 shows κ and λ from one simulation run of 500 epochs each for 25 combinations
of dimcorrel and dimclump. In these runs, the population and context sizes were both set
to 4, because this makes it easier to see patterns. The results suggest that communicative
success is best when the world is highly clumpy but uncorrelated. On the other hand, the
numbers of categories that agents form is highest when the world is completely random,
i.e, neither clumpy nor correlated. These results agree with the findings shown for the
extreme cases discussed in Section 5.2.
co\cl 0 1 5 20 100
0 79.7 84.2 92.1 95.2 96.6
1 73.0 79.2 93.2 95.2 95.6
5 72.4 79.0 89.4 90.8 91.4
20 73.5 73.9 82.7 83.9 84.3
100 78.8 80.0 82.1 81.2 84.7
co\cl 0 1 5 20 100
0 4039 3517 1718 1424 1476
1 4814 3982 1871 1492 1494
5 2470 2230 1450 1320 1302
20 691 698 736 740 782
100 684 678 748 743 781
Table 5.3: World structure: κ (left) and λ (right) for different world structures, defined by differ-
ent dimclump (row) and dimcorrel (column) values.
However, the tables do not show the rate of convergence. In the Figure 5.7(left), dimclump
is fixed (i.e., dimcorrel = 5), and κ is plotted for each of the five simulation runs with
different values of dimclump. Clearly, when the value of dimclump is low, communicative
success converges at a slower rate and stabilises at a lower value, although the value does
not seem to make much difference between the final three cases where dimclump >= 5.
In Figure 5.7(right), the opposite case is shown (dimclump = 5 and dimcorrel fluctuates).
These results show that although higher dimension correlations eventually stabilise at
lower communicative success values, they do lead to faster convergence. This is proba-
bly because high dimension correlation corresponds to less natural kinds, so it is easier
to establish a simple lexicon based on them, but generally harder to distinguish objects
from each other, since they are more likely to fall under the same general natural kind.
5.3.4 Dimensions
Most of the simulations looked at so far are based in a 3-dimensional world. As a result,
agents perceive three features of objects, and build corresponding categories in three
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Figure 5.7: World structure: Varying dimclump (left) and dimcorrel (right).
dimensions. However, this number is arbitrary, and, in fact, humans most likely use
much more than just three features when categorising objects in the world. Therefore, it
is important to consider the scalability of the model to a large number of dimensions.
Figure 5.8 shows the effects of various numbers of dimensions in our four world struc-
tures (with popsize = 2 and conxtsize = 2). The results are very clear. In an uncorrelated
world, communication breaks down significantly when the number of dimensions goes
past about 5: in an 8-dimensional world, the agents barely even reach 10% success rates,
even after 50,000 guessing games. In contrast, a highly correlated world is quite robust
to and arguably even unaffected by higher numbers of dimensions.
Upon reflection, this result is not surprising. In a completely uncorrelated world, values
in one dimension can occur with all values in the other dimensions (mitigated by the
dimension clumpiness of course). In other words, we get a total set of dimension combi-
nations (Garner 1974), of the type that Rosch was arguing does not occur in the natural
world (e.g., things with wings don’t have leaves). At the other extreme, if the world was
completely correlated so that the feature values of objects were identical in every dimen-
sion (which is not possible in this model since this would require dimcorrel = ∞), then it
would be virtually just like having a 1-dimensional world. Indeed, one could then think
of the N dimensions of the world as actually 1 dimension which was simply a conjunc-
tion of the original N ones. In practice, when dimcorrel = 100, there are occasionally cases
where objects have very differing values in different dimensions, but generally they are
nearly identical.





























 0  50  100  150  200
Wo Ws
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 5.8: Varying dimnum in different world structures.
Under this logic, the more correlated the world, the more stable the category system
ought to be with an increasing number of dimensions. In fact, this is perhaps best exem-
plified by the number of categories that agents create, which is shown in Table 5.4 for the
simulations shown in Figure 5.8. Note that the average number of categories explodes
quickly in the uncorrelated worlds, but is roughly constant (or even decreases) when the
dimensions are highly correlated.
5.3.5 Category membership and adjustment
The category membership parameters (memmin andmemconxt) and category adjustment
parameter (adjustrat) are annoying but necessary parameters. Ideally, their actual val-
ues would be inconsequential, so that we could fix them and focus on more interesting
parameters. However, intuitively this seems unlikely, since they affect what choices are
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d\w Wr Wl Wo Ws
1 308 355 335 344
2 262 362 300 322
3 569 340 282 349
4 1766 806 274 328
5 5470 3102 264 356
6 12016 7097 266 370
7 17222 13330 264 379
8 19254 17214 267 365
Table 5.4: World dimensions: λ for different combinations of world dimensions (rows) with
world structures (columns).
made during discrimination games and the structure of the resulting categories. In par-
ticular, the relative values of the two membership parameters should make an impact.
Table 5.5 presents charts for the four world types we have been looking at, showing
κ and λ for different combinations of memmin and memconxt (adjustrat has been set
to 0 for simplicity). Although this is a very sparse sampling of the possible parameter
configurations and the κ values come from only one run each, there does appear to be
a general pattern that the best results occur with higher values of memmin and lower
values of memconxt (although this is certainly violated in Wo).
c\m 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 80.1 87.6 96.4
0.3 75.3 80.9 93.1
0.5 78.9 80.8 93.3
c\m 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 83.2 94.5 99.6
0.3 77.3 89.9 97.9
0.5 76.4 84.1 97.4
Wr Wl
c\m 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 83.5 85.7 91.6
0.3 86.5 85.0 93.7
0.5 86.8 87.9 87.3
c\m 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 87.8 95.8 98.8
0.3 92.6 90.9 97.4
0.5 89.9 92.9 94.6
Wo Ws
Table 5.5: Category membership: κ for different combinations of memmin (m) and memconxt
(c), in four different world structures.
As for adjustrat, Figure 5.8 shows the results for the simple cases of 2 agents and 2 context
objects over 200 epochs. adjustrat is sampled at values of 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and
1.0. Almost across the board, the lower the adjustment values the better. In particular,
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full adjustment (i.e., adjustrat = 1.0) leads to quite poor results. This is a somewhat
surprising result, because it suggests that the agents’ category dimension sensitivities
are best left constant once created. In that case, further experience can only shift the
prototype (as it is not affected by this parameter), but not modify the category’s shape.
It would seem, then, that the benefit of having a category maintain the same extension
in the world (and perhaps more importantly, the same extension as its fellow agents’
corresponding categories) outweighs the benefit of adapting one’s category structure
due to experience. This begs the question of whether the model would do even better if
the prototype didn’t shift either, but currently no parameter controls this behaviour, so
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Figure 5.9: Varying adjustrat.
These “optimal” values for the three parameters (i.e., memmin = 0.9, memconxt = 0.1,
and adjustrat = 0) have been used for the other simulations, without further justification.
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5.3.6 Non-linguistic games
There is a potentially significant objection to the set up of the simulations presented
thus far: all the simulations have consisted solely of guessing games. This means that
all agent categorisation occurs in a social linguistic setting involving two agents and a
common environmental context. But clearly not all of human categorisation is due to lin-
guistic discourse, especially in infancy when children do not yet produce or understand
language but are able to interact with and categorize objects (Mandler 2004). Upon closer
inspection of the guessing game algorithm (see Table 4.4), there is good reason to believe
that this setup makes the agents’ jobs too easy. Notice that in a guessing game, there
are always 1 or 2 discrimination games. The speaker always undergoes a discrimination
game. While the hearer undergoes no discrimination games if it guesses correctly, if it
fails then it undergoes exactly the same discrimination game as the agent did (the same
topic and the same context). Consequently, in the first few guessing games of a simu-
lation, which inevitably fail, the agents (in a 2-agent population) build up exactly the
same category systems, which only begin to diverge with the first guessing game suc-
cess. Even after that, however, a failed guessing game results in the same discrimination
game for speaker and hearer, and if adjustrat is 0, as in most of the simulations above,
the category systems will only diverge significantly when the agents create or split off
new categories.
For this reason, a few simulations were run to see if the addition of private discrimina-
tion games would have a negative impact on communication. The parameter prelingdgs
defines the number of games prior to the beginning of the epochs (as parallels to in-
fant prelinguistic experiences), while epochdgs specifies the number of discrimination
games within epochs (as parallels to adult non-linguistic experiences). Table 5.6 shows
the values of κ after 200 epochs for four different world structures, with different values
of prelingdgs and epochdgs. Although there does appear to be some deterioration when
private discrimination games are included, the effect is not large, with all simulations
reaching at least 90%. This is even the case when agents undergo 5000 initial discrimi-
nation games each and experience five times as many discrimination games as guessing
games in each epoch (epochggs = 100 in all the simulations). Although it is possible that
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the effects may be more significant in more complicated world structures and larger pop-
ulation and context sizes, these preliminary results suggest that agents can communicate
successfully even when they have different individual categorisation histories.
i\e 0 100 500
0 96.5 93.6 92.3
5000 93.8 92.4 93.1
i\e 0 100 500
0 98.6 98.4 98.1
5000 97.7 98.1 98.2
Wr Wl
i\e 0 100 500
0 97.5 91.5 91.0
5000 92.1 90.0 92.0
i\e 0 100 500
0 99.0 94.7 94.8
5000 95.4 96.2 94.6
Wo Ws
Table 5.6: Non-linguistic games: κ for different combinations of prelingdgs and epochdgs,
in four different world structures.
5.4 Dimension Specialisation
Unlike discrimination trees, in which the creation of a new category at any point can
only occur in a finite number of ways (Smith 2003a), category creation in this model
is highly undetermined, and depends largely on the randomly generated context and
topic object values. Indeed, the categorisation history of agents in each simulation is
unique. As a result, it is difficult to analyse the structure of the agents’ category systems.
It is not impossible, however, and in this section I present one example method, which
simplistically measures the relative refinement of an agent’s dimensions.
We first take an agent’s category system at the end of a simulation, and for each dimen-
sion, we calculate the average of the dimension sensitivities across all of the agent’s cat-
egories. If N is the number of dimensions dimnum, and C is an agent’s set of categories,
then we have




Then we define the dimension specialisation ε of an agent to be the ratio between the
largest difference among the si’s and the largest si:
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ε =
maxi,j∈{1,..,N},i6=j |si − sj|
maxi∈{1,..,N} si
(5.2)
This measure gives us a rough idea of how specialised the agent’s most sensitive di-
mension is compared to its least sensitive dimension. A value of 0 would mean that all
dimensions are on average refined to exactly the same degree. As ε approaches 1, one
dimension becomes much more refined relative to another.
Table 5.7 shows the average values of ε across both agents and all 50 simulation runs from
the three-dimensional base case in Section 5.2, along with the standard deviations, ex-
pressed as percents. Notice that there is more specialisation in the more random worlds,
but even there, the specialisation is quite small. This suggests that agents in this model
do not normally develop one dimension in significantly more detail than others. Such a
finding conflicts with that of (Smith 2003b), where agents sometimes became “experts”






Table 5.7: Dimension specialisation: Mean and standard deviation of ε calculations in four dif-
ferent world structures.
5.5 A single word in a population
Until now, I have treated word meanings as associated with concepts. The relations
between a single word to different concepts has not been examined. But ultimately,
it would be useful if we could also treat words the way that dictionaries do, i.e., by
reversing the relationship and considering what concepts are associated with a given
word. Moreover, since words are public, it makes sense in this context to look not just
at a single agent’s associations, but on those of the entire population. Therefore, I will
now look at the case of a single word from a single simulation run, and examine what
categories it is associated with across the entire population.
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The simulation was run with a population size of 4, a context size of 5, and a world
with three uncorrelated but fairly clumpy dimensions with five partitions. The epoch-
related parameters were set to prelingdgs = 1000, epochnum = 500, epochdgs = 100, and
epochggs = 200. By the end of the 500 epochs, the agents communicated with a 90.5%
success rate, and had category systems averaging 3021 categories per agent. Figure 5.10
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Figure 5.10: κ for the simulation used in the single word example.
Table 5.8 lists all the categories of all the agents (at the end of the simulation) that are
associated with the word “bax”. Each category is listed with an index for convenience, a
letter identifying an agent, the score of the category’s association with the word, whether
or not “bax” is optimal for this category (i.e., whether it has the highest associated score),
and the three prototype dimension values and dimension sensitivities that define the
category.
The most striking thing about this list of categories is its length: among only 4 agents,
there are 30 categories associated with the word “bax”. However, an inspection of the
category prototypes reveals that, asides from one exception (i.e., category #15), all the
categories for which “bax” is the primary word have prototypes lying close to [0.7,0.9,0.3].
On the other hand, most of the categories for which “bax” is not optimal have prototype
centres lying elsewhere in the perceptual space, with the exception of a few of the cate-
gories of agent D. Notice also that there are a few cases here of subcategories being asso-
ciated with the same word (e.g., category #5 is a subcategory of category #1). Finally, the
number of categories per agent which are associated with “bax” varies widely from 2 for
agent B to 16 for agent D. Although this seems unreasonably large, agents still converge
on successful communication, so apparently it does not pose a serious problem.
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Ind Agt Scr Opt p1 s1 p2 s2 p3 s3
1 A 229 Y 0.69992 0.27690 0.89916 0.18032 0.29525 0.07449
2 A 7 Y 0.71183 0.00850 0.91190 0.18785 0.31815 0.08598
3 A 3 Y 0.70080 0.08967 0.89737 0.09262 0.29614 0.01061
4 A 1 Y 0.69925 0.18482 0.88870 0.07968 0.31266 0.00615
5 A 0 Y 0.71996 0.01169 0.89916 0.18032 0.29525 0.07449
6 A 0 N 0.67983 0.08118 0.88499 0.08568 0.33482 0.02429
7 A -7 N 0.89806 0.17253 0.50078 0.08935 0.70099 0.08965
8 A -210 N 0.50126 0.08953 0.29953 0.08326 0.30065 0.08382
9 B 238 Y 0.69861 0.09054 0.89789 0.18602 0.29864 0.09254
10 B 7 Y 0.70148 0.00578 0.89789 0.18602 0.29864 0.09254
11 C 188 Y 0.70581 0.07531 0.89252 0.08047 0.29873 0.19896
12 C 44 Y 0.69522 0.01080 0.91346 0.10011 0.30091 0.09416
13 C 16 Y 0.68897 0.08825 0.89792 0.00382 0.29749 0.09338
14 C 7 Y 0.70199 0.09020 0.91392 0.00637 0.29138 0.08549
15 C 0 Y 0.49952 0.08903 0.30989 0.00347 0.30118 0.09335
16 C -2 N 0.89846 0.00645 0.46625 0.07776 0.69778 0.09132
17 D 63 Y 0.69526 0.08021 0.89779 0.17984 0.29600 0.00734
18 D 44 Y 0.70027 0.00556 0.90124 0.10119 0.30311 0.08894
19 D 29 Y 0.68776 0.17648 0.88932 0.08631 0.30960 0.00907
20 D 24 Y 0.70652 0.09448 0.88506 0.07985 0.30137 0.00376
21 D 11 Y 0.69495 0.01723 0.92959 0.18909 0.30535 0.01295
22 D 9 Y 0.71001 0.08806 0.89790 0.18986 0.28441 0.00726
23 D 6 Y 0.70931 0.08775 0.91236 0.18216 0.30345 0.00151
24 D 2 Y 0.70584 0.08694 0.89680 0.00563 0.30803 0.00707
25 D 0 Y 0.72212 0.08124 0.91490 0.00017 0.30447 0.09515
26 D 0 Y 0.71086 0.00527 0.90498 0.00302 0.27690 0.00144
27 D 0 Y 0.73241 0.01897 0.91581 0.27312 0.29137 0.00486
29 D 0 N 0.69101 0.08362 0.90931 0.09986 0.33165 0.02106
28 D -1 Y 0.89826 0.00482 0.50178 0.09494 0.72184 0.01053
30 D -1 N 0.68889 0.00353 0.87014 0.36764 0.30548 0.08689
31 D -2 N 0.71608 0.10700 0.88624 0.17329 0.28556 0.07710
32 D -133 N 0.50186 0.08953 0.29802 0.08326 0.30151 0.08382
Table 5.8: A word in a population: All of the categories associated with the word “bax” for all
the agents in a population. Ind is a convenient index for a category, Agt is a letter identifying
the agent, Scr is the word score, and Opt is Y if “bax” is the word with the highest score for
the category. The pi’s and si’s are the prototype dimension values and dimension sensitivities,
respectively.
Indeed, the results suggest that perhaps it is too simplistic too think of words as being
attached to individual simple categories. Words seem to associate themselves with many
closely clustered categories, so that they could be said to be broadly associated with a
subspace of the perceptual space which more or less contains those categories. This sub-
space could be thought of as a higher-level cognitive entity corresponding more closely
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to a concept. Under this interpretation, while a perceptual category has a single proto-
type, a concept is potentially associated with many. In fact, one could speculate that such
a concept has a representation that brings together exemplar and prototype theory, as it





6.1 Comparison to past results
Since previous models have used very different representations of the world and agents’
categories, many of the results from Chapter 5 do not have obvious analogs. However,
some of the experiments do have close parallels with previous work, and have obtained
similar results.
Most fundamentally, many researchers have found that a population of agents who start
with empty category systems and lexicons can converge on a high degree of communica-
tive success. Moreover, the shape of the convergence curves tends to be similar: starting,
inevitably, at a communicative success of 0%, success increases at a fast rate initially
and then seems to level off at or asymptotically approach some value (e.g., Smith 2003a,
Steels & Belpaeme 2005, Webb 2005).
However, both the speed of convergence and the eventual communicative success rate
tend to be worse than in other models. For instance, in Steels & Kaplan (1998), a popula-
tion of 10 agents reached a communicative success rate of 90% within about 2000 games,
and eventually reached 100%. In contrast, simulations run using the current model with
that many agents never reach 100%, often do not attain a success rate of 90%, and usu-
ally take much longer to converge (although this depends on the world structure: see
Figure 5.4).
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The main reason for this is that every object an agent encounters is a new, previously un-
seen object. Categories cannot get specially tuned to match individual objects precisely,
and new categories do not cease to be created in discrimination games (as it is always
possible that a new context occurs with two extremely similar objects, for example). On
the other hand, in other simulations, the world is typically finite and usually consists of
a fairly small number of objects (e.g., in the example above from Steels & Kaplan 1998,
it was 10). Over the course of many games, the same objects and even the same context
can recur. As a result, it is easier for the agents to converge on a good set of categories
and words that may be adapted to that particular set. This can be seen from the fact
that when such models introduce new objects during a simulation, the communicative
success goes down significantly for a time, even if it had been at 100% (Steels & Kaplan
2002).
Another reason why the categorisation model used here may be intrinsically slower is
that there is higher potential for variation between agents compared to other models. For
instance, Smith (2003a) has studied discrimination trees in detail, and demonstrated how
variation in their growth is quite constrained. Indeed, after a finite number of discrim-
ination games, there are only a finite number of possible category systems. In contrast,
in this model, since objects and prototypes are both real-valued vectors in a continuous
space, there is a mathematically uncountable number of possible category systems even
after only a single discrimination game.
This model has yielded similar general results to other models in terms of the effects
of population size, context size, and number of dimensions. Not surprisingly, for each
parameter, higher values generally result in slightly lower communicative success and a
slower rate of convergence (e.g., Smith et al. forthcoming, Vogt & Coumans 2003, Divina
& Vogt forthcoming). However, I have shown that the significance of varying these
and other parameters depends on the world structure. For instance, an increase in the
number of dimensions had an overwhelmingly negative effect, but only in uncorrelated
worlds. This result resembles that of Webb (2005), who found that a well-structured
world resulted in higher communicative success.
Finally, the relationship between meaning similarity and communicative success has
been studied in various models (Smith 2003a) but has not yet been looked at here in de-
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tail. Preliminary investigations suggest that, in contrast to Smith’s (2003a) simulations,
agents do not become increasingly sensitive to particular dimensions. On the other hand,
the more general finding that communicative success is correlated but consistently su-
perior to meaning similarity between agents most probably holds here as well, at least
in the cases where communicative success is very high, as it is difficult to see how the
agents’ category systems could develop so closely given the huge range of possibilities.
Indeed, one of the potential drawbacks of this model is that it is difficult to analyse
and compare agents’ category systems, even compared to other prototype models. For
instance, Belpaeme (2002) developed mathematical measures for comparing agents’
prototype-based category systems. However, the measures he used cannot be directly
adapted because they rely on the fact that the gaussian functions he uses to represent
prototypes have fixed and equal widths. As demonstrated in Section 5.4, the agents’
conceptual structures are not an inaccessible black box, but more consideration would
be required in developing more sophisticated measures.
6.2 Evaluation
It is important to step back and scrutinise how lexical emergence models in general, and
this model in particular, actually relate to real language evolution. To do this, I return to
Noble’s (1998) justification of computational simulations (see Figure 3.1). Recall that the
usefulness of computational modelling rests on a relatively faithful mapping between
AR and AM , and a comparison betweenEM and ER. In our case, this amounts to asking
two questions, which I will try to take a brief stab at here:
(1) How well does the model reflect our knowledge and theory about how lexical emer-
gence really occurred?
(2) How closely do the simulation results correspond to the actual one-word stage that
presumably occurred in real language evolution?
Question (1) has been addressed intermittently throughout this dissertation. The cate-
gorisation of agents in this model is based on an idealised model of prototype theory,
that incorporates the ideas of prototypical members and graded membership (see Sec-
tion 2.3.2). At any one time, however, categories do not have fuzzy boundaries, although,
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as we have seen, it has been disputed whether human categories do either. Three points
must be borne in mind, however. First, the idealisations that I have used may be signif-
icant: for instance, agents all use the same dimensions when categorising objects, and
detect them perfectly. Second, prototype theory has been challenged with moderate suc-
cess by other concept theories, such as exemplar and theory theories (Murphy 2002).
Third, the hominins who developed a holistic language did not necessarily categorize in
the same way as we do now: although some studies have suggested that animals do use
prototypes as well (White et al. 1993), the evidence is still very scant.
The model here has also explored worlds that are infinite, but imbued with a fair amount
of structure, that could be easily manipulated. The unbounded number of objects in the
world reflects the fact that we are constantly encountering new objects (although per-
haps typically belonging to the same category as previously seen objects), and that even
the same object can appear differently in different circumstances. The clumpiness and
correlation of the dimensions reflects the fact that not all dimension values are equally
likely, and that some feature combinations are more common than others (for instance,
it is rare to see dogs with three legs, and one never sees dogs with wings). These are
idealisations, however, and it would be impossible and even absurd to attempt to pin
down values for the world parameters which would reflect how the world is actually
structured.
As for the simulation dynamics, I have borrowed the general mechanisms directly from
the line of work begun by Steels (1996a,b). The discrimination game presents an idealised
procedure for agents to develop categories based on interactions with the environment,
and the guessing games add on top of this a two-agent interaction using rudimentary
linguistic communication. However, these are not the only kinds of interactions possi-
ble: indeed, Vogt Vogt & Coumans (2003) have compared the guessing game with other
candidate language games and discovered that their results can vary significantly. In
this model, the details of the algorithms also needed to be modified to conform with the
types of category representations used. Although I have attempted to make decisions
that were environmentally driven and as psychologically plausible as possible, the low-
level decisions were sometimes nearly arbitrary and alternative implementations were
not attempted.
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Question (2) is even trickier to handle. We are meant to evaluate the model by comparing
the simulation results with the phenomenon under study. Yet that phenomenon itself is
not well understood. If we were modelling the acquisition of a language by a human
child, then at least we could compare the results to the behaviour of actual language
learners. In the case of language evolution, however, and lexical emergence in particular,
we have no direct access to the actual phenomenon under study. Indeed, although one-
word stage has been advocated (Jackendoff 1999) and often presupposed (Gong et al.
2004), we cannot be sure what such a stage was like, how quickly it emerged, or even
whether it existed at all. As a result, it is most difficult to relate simulation results to
actual language eovlution.
In particular, there is a tendency to search for the conditions under which behaviour is
optimised, which in this case normally means that a high communicative success rate is
reached. But how do we judge how successful linguistic communication actually was in
its earliest stages? On one hand, it seems like there would be no motivation to invent
and learn words if they were not useful right away, inviting us to believe that a high rate
should be sought. But we could equally well argue that the last prelinguistic hominins
had survived evolution without linguistic means, and that language may have initially
been merely an optimisation on communication, rather than a requirement. From this
point of view, even low rates of occasional lexical success are useful, in that they are
better than no attempts and thus no success at all. Hominins who did “try” to start
language off would thus fare better than those who didn’t. Of course, this argument
too requires caution, as it presumes that even initially language users held a selective
evolutionary advantage.
Consequently, the model I have used here cannot independently answer any general
questions with authority. To really learn how lexical emergence occurred in the evolution
of language, we must continue to accumulate converging evidence from a vast variety
of different disciplines, and to continue to build more realistic computational models. I
believe that the current model has, however, contributed to our understanding of lexical
emergence by replicating past results with a more realistic representation, and added
support for the self-organisation explanation.
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6.3 Future work
This dissertation presents a new model of lexical emergence that has just begun to be
explored, and further research could proceed in several directions. The parameter space
should be explored in more detail, with different combinations being tested, especially
under less ideal conditions. Simulation results should be analysed statistically to deter-
mine the significance of the results, which can at present only be claimed to be sugges-
tive. The simplistic one-generation model could be modified to allow for agent removal
and addition (to simulate evolution), and the learning of a lexicon by new agents from
older agents (Smith et al. 2003). Noise could be added to the model, to see if the ide-
alisations used here are significant (Steels & Kaplan 1998). Efforts should be made to
motivate low-level decisions in the categorisation algorithm with psychological find-
ings. Real human language experiments should be performed and the results integrated
with those of the simulations. Other models could be designed using the same model
of world generation but different categorisation theories, such as exemplar-based mod-
els (following Nosofsky et al. 1994), as well as the previously used discrimination trees
(Smith 2003a). The prototype model could be used and tested with robots, as in the Talk-
ing Heads Experiments (Steels & Kaplan 2002). The effects of Lexicalisation of concepts
could be explored Lupyan (2005), and integrated with the developmental studies on the
subject (Bowerman & Levinson 2001, Gopnik & Choi 1990). Memory effects could be
built in, such as enhancement or fading of categories and word forms based on usage
history (Belpaeme 2002). And in general, such computational research should inform
and be informed by diverse fields such as psychology, linguistics, philosophy, biology,
archaeology, neuroscience and computer science.
6.4 Conclusion
Many computational models have shown that lexical emergence can occur via a process
of self-organisation among a population of agents, but they have tended to use unre-
alistic representations. In this dissertation, I have presented a more realistic model of
agent categorisation, and exposed agents to an infinite, clumpy and correlated world.
Although the preliminary results are only suggestive, they do show that lexical emer-
gence does emerge under various conditions. In time, the agents do converge on a co-
herent lexicon, so that they are able to identify the objects that their interlocutors are
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referring to with a high level of success. However, the rate at which this convergence
occurs, the level that it eventually reaches and other aspects of the simulation dynamics
are sensitive to the different model parameters. In particular, I have argued that world
structure, an issue largely unaddressed in other models, has a significant effect on how
scalable the system is in terms of other parameters. However, much exploration remains
to be done to explore the dynamics of this model in more detail, and it should be consid-




Below is a full list of the simulation parameters used in the model, along with their range
of possible values and a brief description. All parameters are set once at the beginning of
each simulation with a configuration file, and kept constant throughout the simulation.
Parameter Values Description
popsize {2, 3, ...} Number of agents in the population.
conxtsize {2, 3, ...} Number of objects in each environmental context.
dimnum {1, 2, ...} Number of object dimensions which are detected by agents.
dimparts [1,∞) Number of partitions into which the dimensions are di-
vided.
dimclump [0,∞) Degree of clumpiness within a dimension.
dimcorrel [0,∞) Degree of correlation between the dimensions of objects.
memmin [0, 1] Minimum category membership for an object to be consid-
ered a member of a category.
memconxt [0, 1] “Target” category membership for the non-topic context
objects during category creation.
adjustrat [0, 1] Ratio by which a category’s dimension sensitivities are
changed during category adjustment.
prelingdgs {1, 2, ...} Number of discrimination games per agent prior to the on-
set of the epochs.
epochdgs {1, 2, ...} Number of discrimination games per agent per epoch.
epochggs {1, 2, ...} Average number of guessing games per agent per epoch.
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APPENDIX B
Mathematical details of object generation
In this appendix, I will demonstrate the mathematical details of how an object is gener-
ated by looking at a specific world configuration, showing how the probability distribu-
tion functions are defined, and using them to generate a single object.
Suppose that the world structure parameter values for a simulation are dimnum= 4,
dimparts= 5, dimclump= 9.2, and dimcorrel= 4.5. As we will see, this configuration will
result in objects that have four fairly correlated dimensions, with dimension values
strongly biased towards 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9.
The values generated for a dimension are selected according to a probability distribution
function, ζ . The interval [0, 1] is divided into five equal partitions, and each partition is
further subdivided into two equal halves. ζ is then defined piecewise in terms of one
function for each of the ten subintervals: ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζ10. The probability distribution
over the first partition is then defined as ζ1(x) = cx9.2, ζ2(x) = c(1/5 − x)9.2, with c (a





1/10. The other partitions have exactly the same distribution functions, except of course
that their domains are shifted appropriately.
In order to generate numbers according to ζ(x), we need a function that takes random
numbers from the interval [0,1] and maps them back onto the same interval but proba-
bilistically according to ζ(x). It can be verified that such a function θ can be obtained by
taking the inverse of the indefinite integral of the probability distribution function, i.e.,
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θ(x) ζ(x)
Figure B.1: Object generation: Feeding random numbers in [0, 1] through θ(x) gives numbers
according to the probability distribution ζ(x). This mechanism is used to make dimension values
clumpy across all world objects.
At this point, we could take four random numbers between 0 and 1, plug them through
θ, and create a new object by setting its dimension values to the resulting outputs. If we
generated many objects in this way, the distribution of values in each dimension would
reflect our probability distribution function ζ . We would then have a dynamic world of
objects with certain dimension values being more common than others.
However, this is not quite sufficient. The above mechanism generates a value for each
dimension independently, so there are no correlations between the dimensions. This
would be like having a world in which having feathers and flying were completely in-
dependent properties. In such a world, agents could not infer from something having
feathers that it could probably fly, or vice versa, so that no features would serve as a cue
for any other features or object kinds. And, indeed, this is reflected in the fact that the
parameter dimclump has had no role in the above mechanism. In order to incorporate
dimension dependency into the object generation algorithm, we cannot simply use four
random numbers to feed through θ.
Consequently, when a new object is to be generated, we first obtain a single random
number, r, on the interval [0, 1]. Suppose, for concreteness, that r = 0.3. This num-
ber is used to set up a two-part piecewise probability distribution function φ (called φr
in Section 4.3.2 but abbreviated here), with the first piece (φ1) defined on the domain
[0, 0.3], and the second (φ2) on the domain [0.3, 1]. The distribution function has the
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shape φ1(x) = a1x4.5 and φ2 = a2(1 − x)4.5, where a1 and a2 are uniquely determined by
the conditions φ1(0.3) = φ2(0.3) and
∫ 1
0 φ = 1.
As we did for ζ , we obtain a function ψ that will give us random numbers in propor-
tion to the values of our probability distribution function φ by taking the inverse of the
integral, i.e., ψ(x) = (
∫
φ(x))
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φ(x) ψ(x)
Figure B.2: Object generation: Feeding random numbers in [0, 1] through ψ(x) gives numbers
according to the probability distribution φ(x). This mechanism is used to make the dimensions
values of the object being generated correlated with each other.
Having defined ψ, the algorithm now uses it to generate a set of values, one for each of
the four dimensions, by plugging four random numbers through ψ. This gives four val-
ues that are similar to each other. These values are then plugged through the dimension
distribution function θ above, moving these values closer to the partition midpoints.
To exemplify, say we obtain four random numbers 0.6822, 0.0817, 0.3524, and 0.7604.
Plugging each of them through ψ(x) gives us 0.3936, 0.2368, 0.3098, and 0.4240. Notice
that these values are all closer to 0.3 then the numbers from which they came, which
reflects the correlation that exists between the dimensions. When these values are now
fed through θ(x), we get the new object’s dimension values: 0.3237, 0.2908, 0.3010, and
0.4869. These values are indeed closer to the partition midpoints: three of them are
close to 0.3, while one is close to 0.5, showing that although there are strong correlations















































































Table C.1: Proof of bound on context object category membership: When a new category is cre-
ated, the category membership of non-topic context objects is bounded above by the memconxt.
ot is the topic, O is the context, pi is the prototype value in dimension i, si is the dimension sen-
sitivity in dimension i, m is an abbreviation for memconxt, and N is an abbreviation for dimnum.
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